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LIST OF PARTIES
Nancy Madsen - Plaintif&Appellant. Nancy Madsen, along with her
husband Richard Madsen, was the obligor on a mortgage loan that was owed to
Prudential Federal Savings and I oan \ ssociation I he Madsens later divorced, and Mr.
Madsen has since passed away. Thus, Ms. Madsen is the sole representative of the class
In connection with this loan, the Madsens paid amounts to Prudential for a reserve
accoiint for the payment of taxes and insurance on the property that secured the loan.
2.

Washington Mutual Bank, fsb

Ddaidanl \ppclln; mid Cross-Appellant

Washington Mutual Bank is the successor-in-interest to Prudential Federal Savings and
Loan Association, the holder of a mortgage loan made to Richard Madsen and Nancy
Madsen.

Because the pleadings throughout the history of this case usually refer to "Madsens" in
the plural, Prudential has continued to use that designation in this brief, though Nancy
Madsen is the sole class representative.
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Washington Mutual Bank, fsb, successor in interest to Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Association, ("Prudential"), the Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant in

Appellate Procedure.
I

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

I In: I "urn I has juiisdidion over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0(2001).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR CROSS-APPEAL AND
CORRESPONDING STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Statement of Issue:

Did the district court err in determining that federal regulations do not preclude all
claims for interest on reserve accounts, or, in the alternative, all such claims after July 16.
1975?
Standard of Review. This issue is governed b\ 1 n (' P R §§ 5-1 S,6-1 I (c), 554.1,
and 541.5. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness, affording
no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. R.A. McKellExcavating, Inc. v.
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 100 P 'VI 1 1 ^ , I 1M (I 'tali ?0(M I
2.

Statement of Issue:

Did the district court err in excluding Prudential's evidence on the issue of
whellinr mn "special agiccniPiif1 cxistol rct^ircling ihc use of any pledged monies?
Standard of Review. Because the trial court excluded evidence based on its
interpretation of the prior Utah Supreme Court Decision in this case, that interpretation is

uestionoflaw reviewed for correctness. Jensen v. ItIC Hasp • nc, K2 P id 10 76,
# (Utah 2003).
Statement of Issue.
Did the district court en' in i ompuunding I In: interest awarded to the Madsens and
111 plaintiff class?
Statement of Review. Entitlement to prejudgment interest is a question of law,
villi ih is reviewedfor"correctness. / \>(*n v ttwton^ ;S l\\d d 16, b U> (Utah 2000).
Statement of Issue.
Did the district court err in granting class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A),
I hen linn I\J'I iiu hki. liliood if inconsistent judgments in this case?
Standard of Review. Because Prudential does not challenge any factual findings
but raises only the proper application of the rules, this is a legal issue reviewed for
correctness. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004).
m.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANI> ST ATI I'M >KY AUTHORITY

The issues presented on appeal are generally governed by common law. In
addition, the issues presented on appeal and cross-appeal regarding the payment of
interest on mortgage reserve accounts are governed by 12 C.F.R. ^§ 545,6" I lie), '"o4,I
and 541.5 (attached as Addendum 1) and by Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4 (attached as
Addendum 2).

2

IV.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
Nancy and Richard Madsen ("Madsens") si led Pn idential seeking to reco\ ei

interest or earnings on amounts paid into a reserve account (or budget account)
maintained to pay taxes and insurance on the property securing their mortgage loan.
Pn identia 1 dispi itedthat any profits were earned on the money, and disputed any
obligation under the law or the parties' contractual agreement to pay any such interest or
earnings to Madsen.
B.

Course of Proceeding and Disposition of Case in the Trial Court.
1.

In 1975, Madsens filed this action seeking recovery of interest or earnings

on amounts paid into a reserve account (or budget account) maintained for the purpose oi
pa> ing taxes .ILHI ti isunn u t m • I he property securing their mortgage loan.
2.

In 1976, the trial court granted Prudential's Motion,, for Si immary Judgment

dismissing Madsens' claims, and denied Madsens' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Madsens appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded, but
did not direct (h; i( Madsen' niolion He JL'T'HIII '..I, Set MacLst n v. Prudential Fed Say. &
Loan Ass % 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977) (hereafter "Madsen F).
3.

On July 13,1977, the trial court entered an Order conditionally certifying a

class IIIUJH I llith K'tiic oH 'ivii IVotvdiire 2Mh)( 1 )( \ i R. h Hi 41
4.

' On July 28, 1977, Madsens filed their Second, \ mended ('oinplumt.

R. 647-53. Prudential removed the case to the United States District Court for the
I> •

••

.772-77.

5.

On April 19, 1979, Judge Aldon Anderson of the United States District

Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential,
dismissing Madsens' claims because certain federal regulations prohibited Prudential
from paying interest or earnings on a reserve account. R. 3602-06.
6.

Madsens appealed the federal court ruling. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit

Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, not on the merits but solely for lack of federal
jurisdiction because a "federal question" was not presented on the face of the complaint
but existed only in defense. See Mads en v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'rc, 635 F.2d
797 (10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
7.

In 1979, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Interest on Mortgage Loan

Reserve Accounts Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-17-1 to -10 (the "Reserve Account Act").
Consistent with the Reserve Account Act, Prudential (as did other Utah mortgage
lenders) gave borrowers, including Madsens, the option either to continue paying into a
non-compensated reserve account or to pay taxes and insurance directly without a reserve
account. Thereafter, any borrower who continued to pay into a non-compensated reserve
account did so voluntarily.
8.

On October 14,1981, Madsens filed their Substitute Third Amended

Complaint (Class Action) (the present complaint) which alleged a class that was defined
differently than both that alleged in the original complaint and that described in Judge
Croft's 1977 Order of Conditional Certification. R. 974-1000.
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9.

On September 3, 1985, on the eve of trial of Madsens' individual claim, tl

trial court, on its own motion, entered an Order "on the effect of the Supreme Court's
ruling in this case (dated January 14, 1977)." R. 2026-28. In that Order, the trial court
(1) prohibited evidence on the issue of whether compensation was intended by the partit
and the purposes for the reserve account; (2) construed the trust deed and ruled that the
"budget payments" paid by Madsens constitute a common law pledge, thereby limiting
the trial to the sole issue of determining whether Prudential "has earned any profit from
the use of the pledged funds, and if so, for an accounting of those profits;" and
(3) "reconfirmed" Judge Croft's conditional certification order. R. 2026-27.
10.

On September 4-6,1985, trial was held before Judge Kenneth Rigtrup on

Madsens' individual claim only, with all class issues being reserved. R. 2994, 3003.
11.

After trial, Prudential moved to disqualify Judge Rigtrup because he

disclosed, on the eve of trial, that he was a class member. R. 2064-65. Prudential's
motion was granted. R. 2239. Madsens appealed (R. 2325-44), and that order was
reversed. See Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988).
12.

On March 22, 1990, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law on Madsens' individual claim only, again concluding that "[a]ll clasj
issues are reserved for further proceedings." R. 3003. Madsens were awarded damages
of $134.70, plus interest at 10% per annumfromthe date of trial to the entry ofjudgment
Id. The Court fixed the damage recovery periodfromMarch 3, 1971 (four years before
the Complaint was filed) to June 30,1979 (the date after which Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-17-

-5-

1 to -10 became effective and the date on which Prudential no longer required reserve
payments on most trust deeds, including Madsens'). R. 3002. By Memorandum
Decision dated January 30,1998, Judge Stirba ruled that the granting of interestfromthe
date of the trial to the date of entry of judgment was erroneous. R. 6794.
13.

On April 30, 1992, the trial court entered an Order and Judgment on the

Madsens' individual claim in the amount of $134.70, plus interest. R. 3408.
14.

The April 30,1992, Order and Judgment ordered, at the Madsens5 request,

the appointment of a special master ("Special Master") to survey Prudential's records to
determine the most feasible method for identifying class members and for identifying
recordsfromwhich a computation of damages can be made for them. R. 3405-06.
15.

On December 2 and 3, 1996, Judge Rigtrup heard various motions,

including motions relating to the scope and definition of the class. Judge Rigtrup
confirmed the class consistent with the definition pleaded by Madsens in their Substitute
Third Amended Complaint as, among other things, "single-family, owner-occupied,
residential primary residence borrowers who had any funds in escrow reserve budget
accounts during the period March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979," R. 5522 at 3, and to loans
that originated in the State of Utah or seeking to remove the Special Master or the Judge.
R. 5533 at 12.
16.

From December 1996 (when Judge Rigtrup retired) to the time of entry of

final judgment as to the class, Madsens filed numerous motions, including over thirty
(30) motions challenging the class definition, challenging the damages calculation,

-6-

seeking to expand the damages period adopted by the trial court, or seeking removal of
the Special Master, all of which were denied. R. 11055-60.
17.

From December 1996 to the time of entry of final judgment, Madsens file

nine petitions for interlocutory appeal or writs of mandamus, all of which were denied.
R. 11062.
18.

Final Judgment was entered in this matter on June 1,2006. R. 13842-44.

Madsens filed a Notice of Appeal on June 28, 2006. R. 13850-83. Prudential filed its
Notice of Cross Appeal on July 12, 2006. R. 13890-93.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Prudential's cross-appeal seeks a ruling that Madsens9 common law claim for
interest on their mortgage loan reserve account is barred by federal regulations governinj
Prudential which prevent Madsens' claim. On this basis, Madsens' claims were stricken
by the United States District Court for the District of Utah in 1979, prior to this case
being remanded to state court for lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively, the federal
regulations terminate any claim for damages as of June 1975.
Prudential's cross-appeal also seeks a ruling that the trial court incorrectly relied
on Rule 23(b)(1)(A) in certifying a class. Prudential's cross-appeal also seeks a ruling
that the trial court improperly included compound interest in the damages awarded
Madsens. Finally, Prudential's cross-appeal seeks a ruling that the trial court erred in
prohibiting evidence that would support afindingthat Madsens and Prudential had a
"special agreement" contrary to the payment of the interest on the mortgage loan reserve

-7-

account. Thus, by its cross-appeal, Prudential seeks an order dismissing Madsens' claims
and striking the class allegations. Alternatively, Prudential seeks an order remanding the
case for determination of class issues and the existence of a "special agreement."
If the Court denies Prudential's cross-appeal on these issues, Prudential urges
affirmance of the trial court's rulings on statute of limitations issues, damage
calculations, and class definition, thereby denying Madsens' appeal.
The trial court correctly held that Madsens' equitable claim for an accounting is
subject to the four year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).
The trial court also correctly held that if any claim survived the federal regulations, the
Utah Interest on Mortgage Loan Reserve Accounts Act, enacted in 1979, terminates any
claim for damages. Prudential provided notice consistent with the statute, and the statute
does not require interest after that notice. In any event, the notice informed Madsens that
they could stop making reserve account payments and, if they continued, they would be
without interest, thereby estopping the Madsens from claiming interest.
The trial court correctly denied prejudgment interest. The amount of damages was
determined in the broad discretion of the trial court, considering what assumptions might
support the damages.
The trial court's orders determining the definition of the class are consistent with
Madsens' allegations in their Substitute Third Amended Complaint, and should not be
overturned.
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Madsens' numerous attempts to remove the Court-appointed Special Master were
correctly denied by the trial court.
VL
A.

ARGUMENT

Madsen I Did Not Mandate the Result Madsens Now Seek,
Madsens incorrectly argue that the 1977 decision in Madsen I established the

statute of limitations (Brief of the Appellants (hereafter "App. Br.") at 10); the
inapplicability of the 1979 statute, App. Br. at 13; the issue of pre-judgment interest,
App. Br. at 19; the calculation of damages to include compound interest, App. Br. at 21;
and the class definition. App. Br. at 26. However, Madsens5 simplistic argument is not
supported by the Madsen I opinion, and is contrary to the way in which each trial judge in
this case has interpreted that decision. Indeed, Madsens' argument requires this Court to
find erroneous, and thus overrule, each key finding of fact and conclusion of law entered
by the trial court—as well as the trial court's denial of the more than thirty motions
subsequently filed by the Madsens in the past seventeen years—to alter those findings
and conclusions.
In 1975, Prudential moved for summary judgment explaining that under similar
facts the vast majority of courts had expressly held on either a motion to dismiss or on
summary judgment that the lender has no obligation to account or pay earnings on the
reserve funds as a matter of law. Madsens filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary

2

In the mid-1970's, numerous cases were filed throughout the country seeking interest on
mortgage loan reserve accounts. The overwhelming majority of reported decisions
rejected the various theories presented by the plaintiffs. See e.g., Gibson v. First Fed.
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Judgment "on the issue of defendant's liability reserving the amount of plaintiff s
damages for trial." R. 428. The trial court granted Prudential's Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Madsens' cross-motion. R. 479-80.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It did not grant
Madsens' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, but found that factual issues
prevented the granting of Prudential's Motion. Indeed, on appeal, Madsens argued for
reversal on the basis of the existence of factual issues. R. 1736-65.
The holding in Madsen I is aptly summarized in the official syllabus of the Utah
Supreme Court which reads, in relevant part:

Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 614 (ED. Mich. 1973), affd, 504 F.2d 826 (6th Cir.
1974); Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'I Bank, 353 F. Supp. 1072 (WD. Pa. 1973), affd, 487 F.
2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973); Manchester Gardens, Inc. v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 205
F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Umdenstock v. Am. Mortgage & Inv. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1375
(WD. Ok. 1973); Zelickman v. Bell Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass 'n., 275 N.E. 2d 300 (111.
App. Ct. 1971); Brooks v. Valley Nat'lBank ("Brooks F), 539 P.2d 958 (Ariz. App. Ct
1975), vacated, Brooks v. Valley Nat'l Bank ("Brooks IF), 548 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. 1976);
Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Sav. Bank ofNew York, 325 N.E. 2d 527 (N.Y. 1975);
Richman v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 204 N.W. 2d 511 (Wise. 1973); Durkee v.
Franklin Sav. Ass'n., 309 N.E.2d 118 (111. App. Ct. 1974); Yudkin v. Avery Fed. Sav.
Loan Ass 'n., 507 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. App. Ct. 1974); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (ED. Pa. 1973); Petherbridge v. Prudential Sav. &Loan
Ass'n, 79 Cal. App. 3d 509 (1978); Kronisch v. Howard Sav. Inst, 392 A.2d 178 (N. J.
Super. Q. 1978); Tierney v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 83 Misc. 2d 855, 373 N.Y.S.
2d 724 (1975); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, AM S.W. 2d 725 (Ark. 1972);
Cole v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 370 Ohio Misc. 56 (1973); Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav.
Bank ^Carpenter IF), 346 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 1976). Kronisch, Carpenter II and Brooks
II summarize the history of the litigation at that time. But see Derenco v. Benjamin
Franklin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n., 557 P.2d 427 (Ore. 1978) and Madsen I.
At the time of the decision in Madsen I, Article VIII, § 26, of the Constitution of Utah
provided: "It shall be the duty of the [Supreme] Court to prepare a syllabus of all the
points adjudicated in each case, which shall be concurred in by a majority of the judges
thereof, and it shall be prefixed to the published reports of the case." The holding of the
-10-

The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered summary
judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan,
Jr., held thatfact issue whether payments were pledged property existed, thus
precluding summary judgment. Reversed and remanded.
Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1338 (emphasis added). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court held that if
the trial court had considered the pledge theory, questions of fact would have precluded
summary judgment. Madsen I did not reverse the trial court's denial of the Madsens'
motion for partial summary judgment, but said, if"from the use of a pledge, profits are
derived, then " . . . pledgee must, in the absence of a special agreement, account for
them." Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1340. Madsen I did not determine whether there was such a
"special agreement," did not rule on the applicable statute of limitations, did not rule on
the applicability of a 1979 statute that was not yet in existence, did not rule on the issue
of pre-judgment interest or the calculation of damages, did not rule as to the definition of
the class and did not rule on any of Prudential's affirmative defenses. Thus, Madsens'
interpretation of Madsen I is inaccurate.
B.

Federal Regulations Governing Prudential Preclude All Claims for Interest
on the Reserve Account
Madsens' claims are barred because federal regulations governing Prudential (as a

federal savings and loan association) preclude all claims for interest on the reserve
account, and those regulations preempt conflicting state law.

court and the specific issues it resolved in the case should be ascertainable by reading the
syllabus. Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 105 P.2d 347, 350 (1940).
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1.

Under the Supremacy Clause. Federal Regulations Precluding
Payment of Interest on Reserve Accounts Preempt Madsens' State Law
Claims,

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution suspends any state law
that either falls within an area exclusively occupied by federal law or actually conflicts
vs »th federal law. U.S. CONST., Art. VI, cl. 2; see also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U S. 151, 157-58 (1978); Fidelity Fed Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
152(1982).
In this case, the Supremacy Clause operates to preempt all state law that is not
consistent with the Home Owners9 Loan Act of 1933 ("HOLA"), which created a system
of federal savings and loan associations and granted broad regulatory authority over the
operation of these federal associations to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the "Bank
Board"). See 12. U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976). The Bank Board was empowered to "provide
for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation" of the federal
savings and loan associations. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 145. Because of the broad power
granted to the Bank Board in HOLA, state laws that conflict with the Bank Board's
regulations are preempted. See id. (holding that Bank Board regulation permitting
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses preempted California State law prohibiting same).4

4

See Bank ofAm. v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the Bank Board's regulations governing ATM fees preempted state laws on
same subject); Fed. Home Loan BankBd. v. Empie, 778 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1985)
(holding that Bank Board regulation permitting use of the word "bank" in advertising by
federal loan associations preempted Oklahoma State law prohibiting same); Conference
ofFed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'ns. v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[t]he broad
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Among the Bank Board's regulations is a 1975 regulation that confirmed existing
law and explicitly controlled the payment of interest on reserve accounts maintained by
federal savings and loan associations. The regulation provided:
A Federal association which makes a loan on or after June 16, 1975, on the
security of a single-family dwelling . . . shall pay interest on any escrow account
maintained in connection with such a loan (1) if there is in effect a specific
statutory provision or provisions of the State in which such dwelling is located by
or under the State-chartered savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks
and similar institutions are generally required to pay interest on such escrow
accounts, and (2) at not less than the rate required to be paid by such Statechartered institutions . . . . Except as provided by contract, a Federal association
shall have no obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts apart from the duties
imposed by this paragraph
12. C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) (1976) (emphasis added). Under this provision, for loans made
after June 16,1975, a federal savings and loan must pay interest only if required by a
specific state statute. For all other loans, a federal association has "no obligation to pay
interest on escrow accounts," "except as provided by contract." Id.
The "no obligation" clause of this regulation applies to loans entered into before or
after June 16,1975 and merely clarified prior law on the topic. Two long-standing
regulations provided no payment of interest on reserve accounts. See 12 C.F.R. § 544-1
(a) and (b) (1975) (federal savings and loan associations are "not required to distribute
earnings on short-term savings accounts") and 12 C.F.R. § 541.5 (1975) (defining "shortterm savings account" to include "a savings account in a federal association established
for the purpose of accumulating funds to pay taxes or insurance premiums, or both, in

regulatory authority over the federal associations conferred upon the Bank Board by
HOLA does wholly preempt the field of regulatory control over these associations.")
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connection with a loan on the security of a lien on real estate.").5 Because the 1975
regulation merely clarified existing law, and did not alter that law, it applies to loans
entered into prior to 1975. See First Fed, Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d
417,425-26 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that Massachusetts law requiring federal associations
to pay interest on reserve accounts more broadly than federal regulations, including
interest on duplexes and a loan made before June 16,1975, was in direct conflict with
federal regulations and therefore preempted by federal law); see also Kinee v. Abraham
Lincoln Fed. Sav. &LoanAss% 365 F.Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (practice of not
paying interest on mortgage loan reserve accounts "is specifically authorized by the
regulations of the Home Loan Bank Board.")6 Madsens' loan falls into this category,
meaning that Prudential "ha[d] no obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts55 except
as required by contract. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c). Here there is no contractual provision

s

12 C.F.R. § 545.5 and 544.1(a) and (b) were codified in 1958. See 23 Fed. Reg. 9890,
9893 (December 23, 1958).
6
12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 was recodified in 1979 at section 548.3. See 44 Fed. Reg. 39128
(July 3, 1979, as amended at 44 Fed. Reg. 57386 (Oct. 5, 1979)). HOLA regulations
were then substantially amended in 1983 as a result of the Garn-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, which deregulated the savings and loan industry. See 48 Fed.
Reg. 23032. Subsequent regulations continue to preempt state law concerning payments
on mortgage escrow accounts. See, e.g., Flagg v. Yonkers S&L Ass 'n. FA, 307 F. Supp.
2d 565, 576 (S.D.N. Y. 2004) (stating that New York statute requiring payment of interest
on mortgage loan reserve account was preempted by HOLA and its regulations), ajfd,
396 F.3d 178 (2nd Cir. 2005), cert, denied, 126 S.Ct. 343 (2005); Wise. League ofFin.
Insts., Ltd. v. Galecki, 707 F. Supp. 401 (W.D. Wise. 1989) (holding that Wisconsin
statue requiring interest on mortgage escrow accounts was preempted by HOLA
regulations as to federal associations.
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requiring the payment of interest on Madsens' reserve account, and Madsens' claim is
barred by the federal regulations.
2.

Judge Aldon Anderson of the U.S, District Court for the District Of
Utah Correctly Held in this Case that Federal Regulations Preclude
Madsen's Claims,

When this case had been removed to federal court, Judge Aldon Anderson adopte
this reasoning and granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment dismissing
Madsens' claim and stating that "the court is persuaded that Madsens' claim against
Prudential is wholly without merit." R. 3603. Judge Anderson summarized the
preemption issue as follows:
Under the federal preemption doctrine, Madsens have no claim against Prudential
for interest on their escrow account. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) clearly precludes th<
relief the Madsens are seeking. That regulation is not subject to attack under the
theory that it retroactively abrogates vested rights. There is no assurance that,
under state law, Madsens at any time had any kind of right, much less an
inviolable vested right, to receive interest on the escrow funds. More importantly
the regulation cited above does not appear to alter the federal law applicable to
loans made before June 16, 1975, but instead appears to reaffirm the impact of 12
C.F.R. §§ 544.1 ("association is not required to distribute earnings on short-term
savings accounts") and 541.5 (defining short-term savings account as including
mortgage loan escrow accounts for taxes and insurance).
R. 3604.
Although Judge Anderson's ruling was reversed, it was reversed solely on the

grounds of jurisdiction. See Madsen v. Prudential Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 635 F.2d 797
801 (10th Cir. 1980). His substantive analysis of the underlying issue remains sound.
Under federal regulations, Prudential is not, and never has been, obligated to pay interest
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on Madsens' escrow account, and Madsens' claim should have been summarily
dismissed by the trial court.
3.

The 1977 Supreme Court Decision Did JNot Decide this Issue,

The decision in Madsen I did not decide the issue of federal preemption. As stated
more fully in Section VIA, supra, that decision reversed and remanded summary
judgment in favor of Prudential due to the existence of factual issues. The decision in
Madsen I did not address any issues of federal preemption, or any other affirmative
defenses that could be raised by Prudential, but merely held that the "essential elements
of a pledge" existed, and remanded for further proceedings. See Madsen, 558 P.2d at
1339-40. Thus, the law of the case established by Madsen I is, at most "that the budget
payments constitute 'pledged' property under the law and are to be so treated in the
proceedings that must follow." R. 633.
"The law of the case doctrine specifies that when a legal decision is made on an
issue during one stage of a case, that decision is binding in successive stages of the same
litigation." Jensen v. IHCHosp., Inc., 82 P.3d 1076,1091 (Utah 2003) (quotations
omitted). Importantly, "[t]he law of the case doctrine does not bar a later court from
considering matters that 'could have been, but were not, raised and resolved in the earlier
proceeding.5" Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1989) {quoting Signal
Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge W-701, 654 F.2d 1164, 1169 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455
U.S. 944 (1982). "[W]hen further proceedings follow a general remand, the lower court is
free to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate issued by the higher court."
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Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n. Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir.
1993).
Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 119 P.3d 302 (Utah Ct. App.
2005) (^Dunlap IF), a quiet title action, is instructive on this issue. The trial court
initially granted summary judgment in favor of Dunlap based on the chain of title
established by a 1941 foreclosure and denied Dunlap's motion for summary judgment or
its adverse possession claim. See Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 16
P.3d 711, 713 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) ("Dunlap F). Mayflower appealed and the Court oi
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that "Mayflower's chain of title . . . is superior
to that of the Dunlaps." Id. at 715. After remand, Mayflower argued that Dunlap /had
effectively resolved all issues and mandated that the trial court simply quiet title in
Mayflower. Dunlap II, 119 P.3d at 303 . In Dunlap II, the Court of Appeals held that
though the decision in Dunlap I determined that Mayflower's chain of title was superior
to Dunlap's, the decision "did not foreclose the possibility that the Dunlaps may
challenge Mayflower's preeminent status as record title holder on such legal theories as
adverse possession

" Id. at 305; see also Gaddis Inv. v. Morrison, 289 P.2d 730

(Utah 1955), (reversing and remanding because the trial court had not made findings
concerning whether the broker had abandoned its rights leaving open the possibility that
the trial court "could reasonably find that there either was or was not an abandonment.")
Schoneyv. Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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In the present case, the preemption issue was not addressed or decided in the
opinion in Madsen L The trial court ruling granting summary judgment that was
appealed did not mention federal preemption. R. 475-76,479-80. Indeed, Prudential's
brief on appeal in Madsen I did not mention the word 'preemption.' R. 17'66-92.
Prudential's brief merely cited to the 1975 federal regulation in its Statement of Facts,
and in its Argument section under the heading "Social Considerations Mitigate Against
Plaintiffs' Claim." R. 1771-72. Similarly, Madsens' brief in reply did not discuss
preemption. R. 1798-1808. The Utah Supreme Court did not address the issue.
Significantly, the Supreme Court's reversal and remand in Madsen I did not order
judgment in favor of Madsens, but merely reversed summary judgment that had been
granted in favor of Prudential on the basis that Madsens' pledge theory created factual
issues. Madsen I did not rule on any of Prudential's affirmative defenses, including
federal preemption.
C.

The Trial Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Supreme Court's Decision in
Madsen I Causing it to Improperly Exclude Evidence of a "Special
Agreement" Regarding the Use of the Pledged Monies.
In Madsen I9 the Utah Supreme Court stated that a pledgee has a duty to account

for profits from the use of a pledge "in the absence of a special agreement to the
contrary." Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1340 {citing Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co,, 76 P.2d
234 (Utah 1938)). The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Madsen 7, and improperly excluded the introduction of evidence of a "special
agreement" between Prudential and Madsens. "Whether a trial court correctly interpreted
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a prior judicial opinion is a question of law that we review for correctness." Jensen v,
IHCHosp., Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Utah 2003).
The trial court, interpreting Madsen I, prohibited Prudentialfrompresenting an;
evidence on whether the parties had a "special agreement" that profits not be paid and
any evidence concerning the reasons Prudential maintained reserve accounts. R. 203031. That evidence would have included the testimony of Richard Madsen in which he
testified that he knew when he executed the trust deed that (a) it required monthly budj
payments, R. 1703-04 at n. 6; (b) Prudential would not pay interest or earnings on the
budget payments, id.; (c) he thought this unfair but did not discuss this with Prudential,
id.; and (d) he paid the monthly budget payments beginning in 1964 without expectatio
that Prudential would pay interest or earnings. Id. This evidence could have supported
finding that a "special agreement" existed contradicting a claim for interest. The trial
court's interpretation of Madsen I as prohibiting the introduction of evidence of a specie
agreement contradicting the claim for interest was plainly incorrect.
D.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Class Certification Under Rule
23(b)(1)(A).
The trial court erred in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Under Rule

23(b)(1)(A), a class can be certified only if the "prosecution of separate actions... could
create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications.. .which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct" for Prudential. Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
The nature of Madsens' claim, combined with the history of this case, establish
that no risk exists of inconsistent rulings which would establish incompatible standards.
-19-

Firsts if potential class members are small claimants, with little or no practical incentive
i > pursue a claim, there is no risk of inconsistent adjudications. See Eisen v. Carlisle &
queline, 391 F.2d 555, 559, 564 (2nd Cir. 1968) (finding that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) did not
apply to claims of a class alleging price-fixing because the individual claimants could not
afford the expense of a complex antitrust suit, so there was little danger of suits that
would establish "incompatible standards of conduct.")
Second, even if there were the possibility of multiple damages suits, there is no
risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications in this case because a "judgment that
defendants were liable to one plaintiff would not require action inconsistent with a
judgment that they were not liable to another plaintiff. By paying the first judgment,
defendants could act consistently with both judgments." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
S. Dist. Ct., S.D. ofCal., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, Flanagan v.
Donnell Douglas Corp., 425 U.S. 911 (1976). See also Nat'I Union v. Midland
Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 687 (D. Kan. 1994) (denying certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(A) and explaining that "National Union is claiming that if there were separate
suits, it might win some and lose others. As stated above, class certification under
23(b)(1)(A) is not intended to address this type of risk.").
Third, the thirty-year history of this case establishes that there is no risk of
multiple suits. No notice of this class action has been given to any class member, and no
other class member besides Madsens has asserted a claim against Prudential. The trust
deed form containing the pledge language was last used by Prudential in connection with
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new loans in 1973. Moreover, evidence submitted by Prudential in 1985 demonstrates
that, when given the option, over 70% of Prudential's borrowers chose to maintain a noncompensated reserve account. R. 1866. Thus, the prospect of varying adjudications has
been proven by the passage of time to be imaginary.
The trial court's order improperly certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) must
be vacated. The improper certification, combined with no notice to class members, has
prevented class members, who are also, by definition, shareholders of the mutual savings
association, from opting out of the class.
F,

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Madsens' Claim is Subject to a FourYear Statute of Limitation,
The trial court correctly ruled that the four year statute of limitations applicable to

actions "for relief not otherwise provided for by law," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3),
governs this case. R. 3002.
1.

Madsens' Claim is on an Implied Contract and the Four-Year Statute
Applies.

The trial court correctly held that Madsens' claim is a claim on an implied
contract, which is subject to the four-year statute of limitations. Madsens incorrectly
assert that "the mandate of the Supreme Court clearly and specifically holds that 'this
action' was 'founded5 on 'an instrument in writing,'" and that as a result, alternatively,
this action is governed by the six year statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. §78-1223. App. Br. at 12. The trial court correctly rejected this argument and concluded that
"[tjhis case is an action for an accounting in equity." R. 3002.
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Madsens do not allege a written contract to pay interest, but rather argue the effect
of a common law pledge. Madsens' claim is not forhreach of contract, but rather for
"Accounting and Unjust Enrichment." R. 980. Madsens abandoned any breach of
ontract claim by amending their complaint to eliminate such a claim. R. 647-53 (Second
\m. CompL); R. 927-38 (Third Am. CompL); R. 974-1000 (Substitute Third Am.
CompL)- Prior to this amendment, the 1977 decision in Madsen I confirmed that the
Madsens' claim is not based on contract, but rather that it "is predicated on the theory
that the monthly budget payments . . . constitute a common law pledge." Madsen, 558
P.2datl339.
In McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995), McKean sued to recover monies paid under a real estate contract.
Under the contract, McKean's predecessor was entitled to partial release of some
property upon payment. McKean sued to recover the money paid when the property was
not released. According to the court:
[the] contract provides no remedy in the event of Alpine's default or refusal to
perform. Thus, McKean's right, if any, to recover the monies paid does not rest
on the Alpine contract, but is implied in law. Because McKean's claims are not
founded upon a written instrument, but rather upon an implied right to recover, the
four-year statute of limitations period applies.
Id. at 1318; see also Am. Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 761 (Utah
1992) (claim for return of allegedly unlawful "impact fees" was equitable so that the
four-year "catch-all" statute of limitations applied); Petty & Riddle v. Lunt, 138 P.2d 648,
651 (Utah 1942) (stating that "where an action is brought to recover an excessive amount
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paid - either under a written contract or other agreement - where there is no written
promise to return said amount, []the action is founded on 'implied contract5 and the
statute of limitations with reference to obligations not founded on a written instrument i
applicable."); Brown v. Cleverly, 70 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1937) (holding that claim for
return of monies paid on rescinded contract was subject to a four-year statute of
limitations because the claim did not arisefromthe written instrument but upon an
implied promise, created by law, of defendants to repay the purchase money paid if the)
should default in the performance of the written instrument); see also CIG Exploration,
Inc. v. HilU 824 F.Supp. 1532,1546 (D. Utah 1993) (applying Utah law and stating that
claims for mistake, restitution/unjust enrichment, monies had and received, and
overpayment to recover excess royalties paid arise from equitable theories of implied an
quasi-contract subject to the four-year statute of limitations).
Here, though Madsens refer to the Trust Deed as a written pledge agreement, thei
right to an accounting, if any, is not based on any provision of the Trust Deed because
there is no promise in the Trust Deed for Prudential to provide an accounting. Thus, the
Madsens request for an accounting is at best a right implied at law arisingfromthe
pledgor/pledgee relationship. Madsens' equitable claim for an accounting is subject to
the four-year statute of limitations and not the six year statute of limitations.
2.

The Statute of Limitations for Recovery of a Bank Deposit is
Inapplicable to Madsens9 Claim for Interest on Escrowed Funds.

Madsens alternatively contend that there is no applicable statute of limitations
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-34 (now repealed) because their claim to interest on the
-23-

budget account should be construed as a claim to recover a bank deposit. App. Br. at 15.
However, the trial court correctly rejected the Madsens' argument, holding that "[t]he
'budget5 account is not a bank 'deposit' within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-1234." R. 3003.
First, the budget payments are not "bank deposits" because they are not subject to
withdrawal by the borrower. Cases from other jurisdictions that are factually similar to
Madsens' claim have ruled that mortgage escrow payments are not "deposits." See
Kronisch v. HowardSav. Inst, 392 A.2d 178, 182 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1978) (explaining that
a deposit is money that can be withdrawn by the depositor, or, in other words, is "subject
to the order" of the depositor, while tax escrow payments are not); Sears v. First Fed
Sav. and Loan, 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971) (holding that tax escrow payments were
not deposits because "one attribute of a deposit is that the depositor retains a right,
generally, under stated circumstances, to receive back all or part of the deposit, or its
equivalent, quite analogous to the rights of a creditor."); Durkee v. Franklin Sav. Ass'n,
309 N.E.2d 118 (111. App. Ct. 1974) ("mortgage agreement is devoid of any language that
would allow them to receive back any or all of their monthly partial tax and insurance
payments"). See also State v Parker, 872 P.2d 1041,1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (money
paid by a prisoner to participate in a rehabilitative program was not a "deposit" within the
meaning of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 28 because "Defendant paid the
money in order to participate in the program with no understanding that it would be
returned."). Here, Madsens had no right to withdraw any budget payments they made.
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Rather, they made payments for a specific purpose without the right to withdraw these
monies, and withdrawal is contradictory to the "pledge" of those payments as security fo:
the debt.
Second, Madsens are not seeking the "deposits" they paid into the reserve accounl
as budget payments. The "deposits" were paid out years ago in the form of tax and
insurance payments, with an annual accounting provided to the Madsens. Rather,
Madsens' action seeks an accounting of interest or earnings on the budget payments, not

the budget payments themselves. See Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d
772, 776 (Utah 1983) ("Moreover, the policy behind § 78-12-34 is to protect persons wh<
have deposited money in a bank account from being barred from claiming that money
years later.") (emphasis in original)).
Third, Conner v. Smith, 51 Utah 129, 169 P. 158 (1917), relied on by Madsens,
merely analyzed when the statute of limitations begins to run, but expressly declined to
determine which statute of limitations applied to a claim to recover two pledged rings.
Id. at 161 ("[i]t is not necessary that we should definitely decide this question [of whethei
the Legislature intended any particular limitation, or whether it should be the general
limitation period]... It is sufficient to say that whether the action should have been
commenced three or four years, or might have been brought at any time, in view of the
facts in this case, it was commenced in time.").
Fourth, Madsens' argument that Madsen I determined that the budget payments
were bank deposits is not supported by Madsen I The passage cited by Madsens merely
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ates that money can be pledged as security. See Madsen 558 P.2d at 1339. Madsen I
did not purport to determine any applicable statute of limitation, or to analyze whether
the pledged money constituted a bank deposit under the now repealed statute relied on by
Madsens.
The trial court correctly held that Madsens' claim is subject to the four-year statute
of limitations.
The Trial Court Correctly Held that Any Claim for Damages Terminated in
1979.
As stated above, Prudential contends that Madsens' claims are barred by federal
regulations. To the extent any claim survived the effect of these regulations, that claim
terminated on July 1,1979 as a result of notice given to Madsens consistent with state
law.
1.

The Reserve Account Act Applies to Madsens' Claims After July 1.
1979.

The trial court correctly held that the Madsens' damages claim was terminated in
1979, when the Utah Interest on Mortgage Loan Reserve Accounts Act (the "Reserve
Account Act") was enacted (now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-1 to -10). The clear
legislative intent of the Reserve Account Act was to establish rules governing all reserve
accounts:
7-17-1. Legislative Intent. It is the intent of the legislature that the provisions of
this act govern the rights, duties and liabilities of borrowers and lenders with
respect to reserve accounts established before and after the effective date of the
act.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-1 (emphasis added).
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The Reserve Account Act had two principal effects. First, it limited recovery ar
established a statute of limitations for actions claiming compensation on amounts paid
into reserve accounts prior to the July 1, 1979 effective date of the Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 7-17-9. Subsection (9) of the Act provides that for reserve accounts established
prior to July 1, 1979, and for which no legal action is pending as of January 1,1979, nc
action lies for interest on amounts held in reserve accounts prior to July 1, 1979, unless
specific agreement existed requiring payment of interest and the limitations period for
such an action would be June 30, 1981. See id. Second, the Reserve Account Act also
created clear rules from that time forward regarding compensation on amounts paid intc
reserve accounts after July 1,1979, whether or not the reserve account was in existence
before or after the date of the Act. Subsection (3) of the Act states the requirements for
paying interest on reserve accounts "in connection with an existing or future real estate
loan." See id. Subsection (4) of the Act describes the options required of lenders to
implement the Act in relation to existing and future loans. Under the statute, if a lender
does not require a reserve account, the lender simply has to inform the borrower of this,
and give the borrower two options {e.g., either to pay into a non-compensated reserve
account or to self-manage payment of taxes and insurance without a reserve account).
See id. The Act clearly requires that a lender "shall give written notice of the options to
the borrower (i) with respect to real estate loans existing on the effective date by notice
mailed not more than 30 days after the effective date..." See id. "For real estate loans in
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existence on the effective date the borrower must select one of the options prior to 60
days after the effective date." Id.
Consistent with the Reserve Account Act, in July 1979, Prudential sent, and
Madsens received, a letter informing them that a reserve account was no longer required
and that any continued payments into the reserve account would be non-interest bearing.
R. 3001. Based on this notice, and the Reserve Account Act, the trial court correctly
concluded that any claim for interest or earnings on Madsens5 reserve account terminated
on June 30, 1979 (the effective date of Prudential's notice). R. 3002.
Madsens challenge this ruling, and point to two subsections of Section 10 of the
Reserve Account Act, which they claim are inconsistent. Section 10 reads:
The provisions of this Act shall apply:
(1) to all reserve accounts; and
(2) to all actions filed after January 1, 1979 to recover interest on or other
compensation for the use of the funds in any reserve account whether or not
the reserve accounts were established prior to or subsequent to July 1,1979.
Utah Code Ann. §7-17-10.
Madsens' argument was correctly rejected by the trial court on several occasions.
The trial court rulings correctly give meaning to the entire statute. The trial court's

n

For example, Judge Stirba expressly addressed and ruled on the supposed inconsistency
relied on by Madsens. Judge Stirba stated:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, when subparts (1) and (2) of Section 7-17-10 are
read in conjunction with the express legislative intent of the act, they are not
inconsistent. As stated in Section 7-17-1, "it is the intent of the Legislature that
the provisions of this act govern the rights, duties and liabilities of borrowers and
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rulings correctly construe subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-10 as meaning that
the requirement to pay interest on required reserve accounts, or to provide the option of a
non-interest bearing optional reserve account, applies "to all reserve accounts"fromthe
effective date of the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-17-3, 7-17-4, 7-17-10(1). This
interpretation is consistent with the application of certain limitations on recovery and
statutes of limitation which apply to actions to collect interest on amounts paid into
reserve accounts prior to the effective date of the Act. See id. §§ 7-17-9, 7-17-10(2).
Each provision of the statute is given meaning.
Madsens9 reliance on statements made in the legislature when the Act was enactec
is unavailing. The legislature's intent in enacting the Reserve Account Act is derived
from the statutory language, and courts may look to legislative history only if the statute
is ambiguous. Smith v. Price Dev. Corp., 125 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Utah 2005). Madsens
have not shown that the statute is ambiguous. Even if ambiguous, Madsens' argument
fails. Madsens cite a statement to the effect that the intention was for the Madsen case tc
proceed to "logical conclusions." App. Br. at 16. The "logical conclusion" is that
whatever claims Madsens had for compensation prior to the effective date of the Act
would be resolved in the lawsuit, but thatfromthe effective date forward, Madsens'
rights and Prudential's responsibilities, like all other borrowers and lenders in the State c
Utah, would be governed by the Act. Madsens' argument asks the Court to hold that

lenders with respect to reserve accounts established before and after the effective
date of this act."
R. 6965.
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prudential and its customers would be governed by a different set of rules after July 1979
than all other lenders and borrowers in the state. That is not a "logical conclusion."
Significantly, at the time of passage of the Reserve Account Act, Madsens' claims in this
case had been summarily dismissed in the federal court, with no certified class of
claimants in existence, and that ruling was on appeal. The trial court correctly interpreted
the Reserve Account Act to give meaning to all its provisions.
2.

The Trial Court's Rulings Are Consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court Interpretation of the Act

The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the Reserve Accounts Act cuts off
damages claims after July 1,1979, if the lender sends the statutory notice (as did
Prudential). In Nixon v. Am. Sav. &LoanAss'n, 635 P. 2d 24 (Utah 1981), the plaintiffs
(represented by the same attorneys representing Madsens in this case) filed suit
(apparently after June 30,1979) seeking to recover interest on a reserve account held at
American Savings & Loan. The plaintiffs sued only for interest on amounts paid into the
reserve account after June 30,1979, the effective date of the Reserve Account Act. The
trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claim and the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed, based on the fact that the lender sent the required notice to the
plaintiffs informing the plaintiffs of their option to discontinue the reserve account, or
maintain a non-interest bearing account. The Utah Supreme Court explained:
Contrary to the assertions of the plaintiffs, it is evident that it was the legislative
intent to give to lenders of existing real estate loans the option of determining
during the month of July 1979 whether they would require the continuation of a
reserve account, and if the decision was made to require it, then 4% interest had to
be paid. It clearly did not lock lenders into the payment of interest under existing
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loans. As heretofore mentioned, the defendant promptly followed the statutory
procedure in making its election by mailing out the required notice during July.
The termination of the requirement of a reserve account was also authorized by tl
trust deed which allowed the lender to waive in writing its continuation.
Id. at 27. The interpretation of the Reserve Account Act made by the trial court is
entirely consistent with the ruling in Nixon, supra.
3.

Prudential's Deposit of Reserve Payments in its Operating Account is
Consistent with the Act

Madsens argue that the Reserve Accounts Act required Prudential to deposit fiinc
in a non-interest bearing account, and that Prudential did not do this when it deposited ti
funds in its general operating account. See App. Br. at 15-17. This argument was
correctly rejected by the trial court. First, Madsens' argument is not supported by the
facts as found by the trial court. The trial court expressly found that Madsens made one
combined monthly payment of principal, interest, tax and insurance, that Prudential
deposited Madsens' payments in its general operating account, and that "Prudential
maintained separate accounting records to credit Madsens for payment of principal,
interest and 'budget' funds." R. 2998. The trial court also found that Prudential "invest!
most surplus funds from the general operating account in short term investments such as
U.S. Treasury Bonds

" R. 2999. No evidence was presented to the trial court to

establish that the general operating account is not a non-interest bearing account, and
indeed the factual findings of the trial court imply that it is a non-interest bearing accoun
with surplus funds being removed and invested in short-term bonds.8

Madsens rely on the Conway Affidavit (which was submitted more than 10 years after
Judge Rigtrup's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered) for their
-31-

Second, the reference in Prudential's letter to a non-interest bearing account does
not require a separate, non-interest bearing bank account. The statute states that the
"borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing reserve account to be serviced by
the lender at no charge to the borrower." Utah Code Ann. § 7-17-4(l)(a). In this context,
use of the word "account" can be read in the same meaning as if a person has an
"account" with the electric utility. It refers to the credits and debits of the parties'
obligations rather than a deposit account.
4.

The Form of Prudential's Notice Complied with the Act

The trial court correctly ruled, on multiple occasions, that Prudential's notice
complies in all respects with the Reserve Account Act, rejecting Madsens' argument that
the notice does not state it was sent "pursuant to the Act." Prudential's notice states:
While Prudential is governed by Federal and not State law in matters dealing with
the terms of a loan contract, the options as set forth herein are consistent with the
provisions of Utah Law.
R. 990.
This statement is completely consistent with the Utah statute, and is similar to the
notice found effective by the Utah Supreme Court in Nixon. Neither the notice in Nixon
nor the notice in this case cited to "Utah Code 7-17-4," because the statute had not yet
been codified when Prudential sent its notice in July 1979. R. 11105-07. Rather, the

argument that the monies were not deposited in a non-interest-bearing account. The trial
court correctly granted Prudential's motion to strike the Conway Affidavit, striking all of
the Conway Affidavit except "statements on accounting procedures." R. 12771. Mr.
Conway's purported factual statement or conclusion regarding where Prudential
deposited the funds cannot be considered a statement of accounting procedures.
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Nixon notice referred to Senate Bill 85, and likewise Prudential's notice referred to "state
law" and stated that the options "are consistent with the provisions of Utah Law." Both
notices are sufficient to alert the borrower that there is Utah law on the subject and that
the notice is given consistent with Utah law, even though Prudential is governed by
federal law.
5.

The Madsens9 Claim was Cut Off on July 1,1979, Even Without
Reference to the Act

The trial court correctly ruled that even if the Madsens were able to raise an issue
concerning the applicability of the 1979 Reserve Account Act, their claims were still cut
off as of July 1,1979. As the trial court found, it is undisputed that the Madsens receive*
Prudential's 1979 notice informing them that their reserve account was no longer
required and that, if Madsens chose to continue their reserve account, it would be noninterest bearing. R. 3001. Because the Madsens knew that the reserve account was no
longer required, and then continued to make payments into the reserve account, they
waived claims and failed to mitigate any damages they could now claim for post-July,
1979 payments. As Judge Rigtrup explained:
THE COURT: You may make an offer of proof. My ruling is still the
same. My ruling is predicated upon the fact that Prudential sent notices to all
account holders saying, "we are not going to keep your money unless you can
consent to us not paying interest, and we are not going to charge you. Or in the
alternative you can take your money."
They had an opportunity, whether by statute or by an act of God or
whatever, they got a specific notice saying that they could take their money. And
they all had an opportunity to mitigate damages.
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And based on that notion, then the Court is concluding that they can't
simply sit there, having been given the opportunity to mitigate damages,
notwithstanding the earlier filing of a lawsuit, and let the damages run. They, as a
matter of common law, must mitigate damages. And on that notion, and that
notion alone, I so rule.
R. 3717 at pp. 292-93.
With or without the 1979 Reserve Accounts Act, Prudential informed borrowers
that reserve accounts were no longer required and that voluntary payments into a reserve
account would be without interest or compensation. The Madsens are barred from
asserting a claim for damages or earnings because they failed to mitigate damages but
rather voluntarily paid into the non-required reserve account. See Turner v. General
Adjustment Bureau, 832 P.2d 62, 66, n.3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, Turner v. Norton,
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) ("a complaining party is not entitled to recover damages from
wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized by reasonable means.");
mdAngelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (same).
6.

Federal Law Cut Off Madsens' Claim At Least As of 1975.

As stated above, federal regulations governing Prudential preempt any state law
that would have required Prudential to pay interest on reserve accounts. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.6-11(c). That regulation, enacted in 1975, merely clarified existing regulations.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 554.1 and 541.5. At a minimum, these regulations make clear that after
1975, Prudential, as a federal savings and loan association, was required to pay interest
on reserve accounts only as required by contract. See Derenco v Benjamin Franklin Fed.
Sav. and Loan Ass % 511 P.2d 477, 496 (Ore. 1978) (holding that 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11
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terminated any obligation of a federal savings and loan association to pay interest or
earnings on a reserve account after June 16, 1975, for all loans, whether entered into
before or after June 16, 1975).
G.

The Trial Court Correctly Denied Prejudgment Interest
1.

The Decision to Deny Prejudgment Interest is a Mixed Question of
Law and Fact

In challenging the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest, Madsens allege that
the trial court "incorrectly applied the law to these facts" so that, on review, this Court
should apply a "correctness" standard of review. App. Br. at 21. However, "when the
trial court applies the facts of the case to the law then the question is a mixed question of
fact and law, and the factual basis underpinning the decision is subject to a clearly
erroneous standard." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 133 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 2006)
(affirming denial of prejudgment interest). Thus, while a trial court's decision as a whole
to award prejudgment interest may be a question of law reviewed for correctness, the
court's factual determinations resulting from the application of law to the facts - such as
a finding that damages are not fixed as of a particular time - are reviewed under the
higher "clearly erroneous" standard.
The "factual basis underpinning" the trial court's decision was the finding that
damages were not fixed as of a particular time because they were "not calculable before
trial" (R. 3003), which finding the Madsens themselves specifically refer to as a "factual
characterization." App. Br. at 21. Therefore, this Court must apply the "clearly
erroneous" standard in determining whether the trial court's decision that damages were
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not calculable before trial is consistent with Utah law. Madsens have failed to meet this
"burden and have failed to marshal all the evidence and demonstrate that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the trial court's ruling on this issue. See Wilson Supply,
Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177, 1183 (Utah 2002).
2.

The Denial of Prejudgment Interest is Consistent with Utah Law and
Should Not be Disturbed on Appeal,

The trial court correctly rejected Madsens' claims for prejudgment interest. This
Court explained in Lefavi v. Bertoch 994 P.2d 817, 823 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) that "a
court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable within a
mathematical certainty" and further explained that:
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be
ascertained in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount rather than be
guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as
well as for future injury
"
Id. (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the "we deny awards of
prejudgment interest in cases where damages amounts are to be determined by the broad
discretion of the [trier of fact]." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1069 (Utah
2003).
In this case, the amount of damages was determined in the broad discretion of the
trial court. In determining the amount of "profit," if any, that Prudential realized from the
Madsens' budget funds, the trial court heard conflicting expert testimony. Prudential's
expert testified that there was no profit and based his opinion on evidence and
assumptions concerning the costs and expenses associated with monitoring reserve
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accounts, and paying taxes and insurance. See, e.g., R. 3717 at 119-121, 135-138.
Madsens' expert presented three different theories of profits and based his conclusions <
various estimates and assumptions concerning Prudential's operations as a whole and
investment opportunities and expenses of Prudential as a whole, without reference to tb
costs and expenses associated with administering the reserve account. See, e.g., R. 371'
at 388-89, 441, and 447. Madsens' expert conceded that the ultimate decision was in th
discretion of the trial court. R. 3717 at 388-89. Judge Rigtrup, faced with differing
assumptions and conclusions, chose in his best judgment which assumptions to accept.
R. 3717 at 501-07. He then found that prejudgment interest was not appropriate since
"damages required a determination by the Court and Q the Court was required to select
one method of calculation from among several alternatives presented by the experts." R
3003-04 (emphasis added). Thus while 'these estimates were a reliable enough basis fo
awarding damages, the assumptions used to arrive at those estimates are by no means tb

only way to arrive at [] damages." Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 85^
P.2d 1030, 1042 (Ct. App. 1993) (denying prejudgment interest on damage award), rev\
on other grounds, 884 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1994). Here, the trier of fact was guided by his
"best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed," which demonstrates that the
damages in this case were not based on fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value and were not calculable with mathematical certainty, and the denial of prejudgmen
interest is not clearly erroneous.
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In support of their argument, Madsens cite to Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d
1064, 1070 (Utah 2003). Smith is factually distinguishablefromthe present case in that it
Involved assessing damages based on the fair market valuation of real property. Smith,
82 P.3d at 1069. The Supreme Court explained that two of its previous cases interpreting
the prejudgment interest standard had already held that "fair market valuations of real
property are within the category of damages upon which prejudgment interest may
properly be awarded." Id. Thus, Smith was a case dealing with settled law and involving
a category of damages that the Supreme Court had already determined were entitled to
prejudgment interest.
The present case does not involve any such category of damages. Rather, it
involves a situation where damages were "ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact at
trial," which is a case in which "prejudgment interest is not allowed." Id. at 1069 n.5
{citing Corina v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)).9 The trial court correctly
applied Utah law to the facts of this case and denied prejudgment interest.

9

See, e.g., Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379,1387 (Utah 1995) (affirming denial of
prejudgment interest on damages for breach of a pasture agreement, though damages
were calculated at $715 per cow and approximately $400 per calve based on conflicting
expert testimony regarding the cattle's expected pregnancy rates, weight range, mortality
rates and market prices); Canyon Country Stores v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah
1989) (denying prejudgment interest on lost profit damages); Anesthesiologists Assoc, v.
St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030, 1042 (Utah Ct App. 1993) (denyingprejudgment
interest on lost profits); and James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d
665, 673 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (denying prejudgment interest on an award of attorney's
fees that required a determination of reasonableness by the Court); compare Trail
Mountain Coal Co. v. State of Utah, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996) (prejudgment interest on
coal royalties based on rates in state regulations governing the lease) and Consolidation
Coaly. State of Utah, 886 P.2d 514, 527 (Utah 1994).
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3.

Prejudgment Interest Is Inappropriate on Madsens' Equitable Claim

Madsens' claim is an equitable claim for an accounting (R. 3002), and Utah law
does not permit prejudgment interest on equitable claims. See, e.g., Bellon v. Malnar,
808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) (no prejudgment interest on equitable claim for return of
down payment to defaulting vendee where claim is of a "highly equitable nature" and tJ
court "has discretion in determining the amount, if any, to be returned); Parents Agains

Drunk Driving v. Graystone Pines Homeowners' Ass % 789 P.2d 52, 59 (Utah Ct. App
1990) (holding provision in a contingency fee agreement was void as a matter of public
policy, remanding, and stating that if there is no enforceable fee agreement, prejudgmei
interest is improper, presumably because the attorneys have only an equitable claim).
4.

Madsen I Did Not Determine Prejudgment Interest

Madsens contend that the denial of prejudgment interest was contrary to the UtaJ
Supreme Court's mandate in Madsen I. This argument is without merit. The Madsens
cite to a passagefromMadsen I discussing the existence of a pledge, in general, and
stating that the "amount [of the pledge] is ascertainable at any given time, and thus the
lien is perfected as to amount." Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1339 (quoting United States v.
Harris, 249 F. Supp. 221, 224 (W.D. La. 1966)). Madsen I quotes the Louisiana court
merely to show that a deposit of money has been recognized as a pledge even though th
amount of the pledge may vary. The cited passage says nothing about the amount of th
loss that the Madsens may have suffered and certainly never held that such a loss was
ascertainable in this case. Madsen I did not mandate any award of prejudgment interest
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U.

Compound Interest on the Damages Awarded is Inappropriate,
The trial court erred in awarding compound interest as part of the damages

awarded for the time period 1971 to 1979. The trial court correctly denied Madsens'
request for compound interest before 1971 and after 1979. In determining damages, the
trial court found the "difference between income and expenses on Exhibit A [to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law] represents profits or earnings which Prudential
has realized by its use and investment of Madsens5 'budget funds.'" R. 3000. The trial
court then stated that it is "appropriate under the facts of this case to compound on an
annual basis... the compound earnings are included in Exhibit A." Id.
Including compound interest as part of the damages awarded was in error. Simple
mterest only is allowable, unless the parties have agreed to compound interest, and no
such agreement exists in this case. In City ofHildale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Moreover, we have previously held that 'compound interest is not favored by the
law' and that, accordingly, interest on a judgment should be calculated simply
unless agreed to otherwise by the parties.
Id. at 707 {quoting Watkins & Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979))
Watkins & Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613 (Utah 1979) was an action to collect
attorney's fees in which the district court compounded interest annually on the unpaid
amounts due. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court with
directions to recalculate the interest at a simple interest rate. Id. at 616. See also Estate
Landscaping and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 793
P-2d 415, 420 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev9don other grounds, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992)
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(trial court's compound interest award prior to judgment was reversed citing "the general

judicial disfavor of interest on interest"); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 78
P.2d 551, 555 (Ut. App. 1989) (compound interest "can be affirmed only if we conclude
the parties expressly agreed to compound interest....").
Madsens' reliance on Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 111 P.2d 571 (Utah 1950) is
misplaced. First, more recent cases of the Utah Supreme Court, cited above, clearly hold
that compounding is inappropriate unless agreed to by the parties. Second, Farnsworth's
award of interest was based on the agreement of the parties. The Utah Supreme Court
explained that "the trial court erred in not prescribing the payment of interest as provided
in the contract" Id. at 576. Third, the court in Farnsworth cites to, and bases its holding
on the older case of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 145 P. 1036 (Utah 1915). The Utah Supreme
Court has since clarified that Jensen permitted compound interest because "the defendant
promised to pay interest at specified times," so that failure to pay at the specified time
created new debt. See Watkins & Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979).
When "there is no promise to pay interest at a particular time," compounding is
inappropriate. Id. Here, there is no agreement to pay interest at any specified time or
amount and compound interest is inappropriate.
Madsens' citation to the Restatement of Trusts is inapplicable because the present
situation is not a trust. See App. Br. at 23. The trial court correctly found that no trust
relationship existed in connection with the reserve account. See R. 3519 (see page 95 of
the record index) ("The Court: It is a common law pledge that arose, debtor/creditor...
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it was not a fiduciary duty.") This conclusion is consistent with Utah law which states
fhat "[t]he relationship between an association and its account holders is that of debtor
and creditor." Utah Code Ann. § 7-7-22. Significantly, in the first appeal of this case,
Madsens expressly disavowed any trust theory, stating, "Madsen has not urged any trust
theory in this court." See R. 1806. In other mortgage reserve account cases, the trust
theory has been rejected. See e.g. Sears v. First Fed Sav. & Loan Assoc, 275 N.E.2d
300, 305-06 (111. App. Ct. 1971) ("We must expressly reject plaintiffs argument that a
trust is created because of the use of the word 'pledge' in the note.").
Madsens argue for compounding by saying that Prudential earned a "double
profit" by earning interest on the budget funds and interest on the mortgage loans.
Madsens' argument is contrary to the damages Madsens asked for, and were awarded, at
trial. Indeed, compounding of interest awards Madsens a double recovery. Madsens
asked for interest or earnings on the budget funds. They could have alternatively asked
for damages in the form of a reduction of their mortgage loan balance but did not.
Madsens cannot be awarded both the interest earned and the benefit had the interest
hypothetically been applied to reduce their mortgage loan balance. By asking for
compound interest, Madsens ask for a double recovery. See R. 3075-76. Madsens' case
is no different than any other case in which a plaintiff claims that money is owed, and
under the clear case law in Utah, compound interest is disfavored and cannot be awarded
absent a contract to that effect.
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L

The Trial Court Correctly Limited the Class to Single-Family, Primary
Residence Loans,
1.

The Trial Court Defined the Class Consistent With Madsens'
Complaint

Madsens complain that the trial court limited the class to single-family, primary
residence loans in the State of Utah even though this class definition is taken directly
from Madsens' Substitute Third Amended Complaint. In that Complaint, Madsens alleg
that they represent a class of people who borrowed money in Utah pursuant to trust deed
identical to Madsens. R. 976. In the next paragraph Madsens also alleged a class as
follows:
Madsen is also a representative member of a class of borrowers who have made
real estate loans in Utah with lenders in which the loan documents provide for a
reserve account. The class is further defined as borrowers who have received a
letter from a member of the defendant class stating in substance and effect that th
reserve account set up by contract is no longer required and that the real estate
loan is, therefore, governed by § 7-17-4 U.C.A.
Id.
Madsens' Substitute Third Amended Complaint further defines "real estate loan"
as "a loan secured by an interest in real estate in this state containing only a singlefamily, owner-occupied, residential structure constituting the primary residence of the
borrower...." R. 975. Thus, the class definition adopted by the trial court was the clas
definition pleaded by Madsens, R. 5522 at 3, and Madsens cannot now complain.
2.

In Defining the Class, the Trial Court Applied Rule 23,

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and (4) state the prerequisites for a class
action, including the requirement that "the claims ... of the representative parties are
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typical of the claims ... of the class and ... the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." The trial court found that Madsens
represented a class of primary-residence borrowers, and that Madsens9 claims are not
typical of, or representative of, a class of investment property borrowers:
And the Court is persuaded that Mr. Madsen is the representative of the
homeowners interest, not necessarily commercial or corporate interest, so
the Court is persuaded that I ought to follow the definition as contained in
the third - Substitute Third Complaint, single family, owner-occupied
residential primary residence borrowers; borrowers from the State of Utah;
borrower who had any funds in escrow reserve budget accounts during the
period March 3, 1971 to June 30, 1979.

THE COURT: My reasoning between the non-occupied or the commercial
kinds of loans is where they are either holding rental property or apartments
or commercial kinds of loans, they may have an interest to go back and
borrow more money. And so they'd be concerned with the relationship
with Prudential in terms of being able to go back to the well. A homeowner
probably isn't really going to consider it because you are trying to get the
best deal you can and buy yourself a home.
R. 5522-23 at 3,11-12.
This decision of the trial court is reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard.
"Whether a case should be allowed to proceed as a class action involves intensely
practical considerations, most of which are purely factual or fact-intensive." Reed v.
Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1988). The trial court's factual determination
concerning typicality and adequacy of representation, like all factual determinations,
should be reviewed under the "deferential clearly erroneous standard." State v. Daniels,
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40 P.3d 611, 617 (Utah 2002) (explaining that appellate courts "owe broad deference to
trial courts engaged in a fact finding role.").
3.

No Notice of Dismissal Was Required When the Trial Court Defined
the Class,

Madsens incorrectly argue that the trial court erred by not sending notice of
dismissal to excluded potential class members under Utah R. Civ. P. 23(e) when the cou
defined the class as primary residence borrowers. App. Br. at 27. Madsen's argument i<
without support because the ruling defining the class did not constitute a "dismissal" for
purposes of Rule 23(e). See R. 5522. Indeed, modifying a class definition is commonly
recognized as a means of avoiding, rather than effecting dismissal. See Davoll v. Webb,
194F.3d 1116, 1146 (10*0^.1999).
Even if the Court's definition of the class did constitute a dismissal of those not
included in the class definition, Rule 23(e) did not require notice because the notice
requirement applies to voluntary dismissals, not to dismissals ordered by the Court.10
Rule 23(e) exists to provide a "check against settlement dynamics that may lead the
negotiating parties . . . to give insufficient weight to the interests of at least some class
members." In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1111 (10th Cir. 2001).
No notice of dismissal was required under Rule 23(e) when the court fixed the class
definition.

In fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) was amended in 2003 to make this rule explicit. See Fed
R. Civ. P. 23(e), 2003 Advisory Committee Notes.
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j#

The Trial Court Correctly Denied Madsens' Attempts to Remove the Special
Master.
The trial court correctly rejected the Madsens' repeated attempts to disqualify or

remove the Special Master.11
1.

The Special Master's Conduct Was Proper and Consistent With the
Express Authority Granted to Him.

The trial court correctly rejected Madsens' argument that the Special Master
engaged in inappropriate ex parte meetings with Prudential personnel, finding that the
communications were fully within the Special Master's scope of authority, were known
to Madsens and to the Court, and were required to fulfill the tasks given by the Court to
the Special Master. The Special Master's duties, outlined by the Court's various orders,
required the Special Master to communicate with Prudential personnel. Those duties
included surveying and analyzing Prudential's loan records and overseeing Prudential's
accounting. R. 3405-06 and 7816. As the Special Master explained, these duties
"required the Master to meet with Prudential personnel, because they held the records we
were to report on." R. 9701.12 The Special Master's communication with Prudential

A summary of Madsens' motions to disqualify or remove the Special Master and the
trial court's rulings is attached as Appendix VIL
Indeed, the Special Master's First Report, dated February 22, 1995 expressly states:
"We have met with Olympus Bank personnel. Based upon our discussions with them and
our review of the available records, we report the following
" R. 4224. In addition,
at a hearing in which the Court instructed the Special Master concerning matters that
would ultimately be contained in the Special Master's updated Second Report, dated
December 31, 1996, the Special Master explained, in open court, "as I've looked at my
records, it is necessary for me to reconvene with the representative ofPrudential and to
re-examine this sample that we \e done." R. 5521 at 9.
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personnel was consistent with the duties given by the Court, was authorized by the Court,
and was known to Madsens.
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990), relied upon by Madsens, does not
support Madsens' argument. Madsens cite Plumb for the proposition that the Master is
akin to a "judicial officer" and therefore cannot communicate with the parties. However,
the Plumb case dealt with a Special Master acting as a type of "commissioner" and
analyzed communications between a judge and Special Master in that instance. Id. at
743. In our case, the Special Master is acting as an examiner or court-appointed expert
witness, as contemplated by Rule 53.13 Indeed, Judge Rigtrup assumed that the Special
Master would, in some instances, be subject to cross-examination. R. 5520 ("And if
that's not the way to handle the problem, then I'm going to look at the master and we
need to have a hearing and get his report orally and on the record and go through his
methodology and how many standard deviations from the mean and all the statistical
analysis as to how accurate his conclusions are."). The Special Master's role required
communication with Prudential personnel and the Special Master's conduct must be
viewed in the context of the duties assigned to him.

Under Rule 53, the term "master" "includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner."
Danville Tobacco Assoc, v. Bryant-Buckner Assoc, Inc., 333 F.2d 202, 208 (4th Cir.
1964) ("Master" was a misnomer.. .the Court chose him as an expert for its guidance. H
was subject to questioning as a witness before and after his counseling advice to the
Court."). United States v. Cline, 388 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1968) (the Court appointed
"master was selected by the Court, quite advisably and altogether permissibly, as an
expert.. .rather than one to perform the duties of a master as the law commonly knows
that office.")
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2.

The Trial Court Properly Accepted the Master's Final Report

Madsens argue that the Special Master's Report on which the Final Judgment is
based is not final. App. Br. at 34. Madsens' argument incorrectly describes the scope
and purpose of the Special Master's March 1, 2002 Report, which was to give to the
Court "the Master's final statistical calculation of aggregate class damages." R. 10201.
Indeed, Madsens argued in favor of such a statistical calculation of aggregate class
damages and consented to the sample testing performed by the Special Master.14 R.
9700. The Special Master's reference to further testing to be done relates to the
anticipated time when class damages will be distributed to individual class members. See
App. Br., Ex. H ("of course, as this matter progresses to the point where damages are
distributed to class members, we will perform additional testing to confirm proper
identification of class members and completeness of the database"). The trial court also
correctly rejected Madsens' claim that the Master was required to file the 70,000 loan
cards with the Court, stating that "[t]he Rule does not require that the Master file with the
Court each and every document used in the statistical plan submitted to the Court." R.
12766.15

The Special Master reported to the Court: "[a]t a meeting with counsel of both plaintiff
and defendant present, it was proposed and agreed that the Master would test the sample
of 400 borrowers previously conducted by Prudential personnel, rather than perform a
new sample." R. 9700. "Plaintiffs Counsel indicated this was acceptable to him, as long
as our testing was done in an objective manner and there was adequate testing of the
sample, or words to that effect." Id.
Madsens state that "Madsen has never seen the 70,000 loan cards
" App. Br. at 45.
However, Madsens were given an opportunity to review the loan cards, but declined to do
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Thus, the report was final for the purposes requested by the Court, and the trial
court accepted the report as the basis for entering judgment.
K.

Madsens' "Short-Cut" is Not Supported By Law,
Madsens argue that if their appeal is successful, the case will require remand,

which would lead to "[a]nother trial, and perhaps another appeal, to resolve the . . . issues
[which] could take five to ten years." App. Br. at 39. Based on this argument, Madsens
make the remarkable suggestion that this Court should ignore the factual findings made
by the trial court concerning damages, and simply apply a passbook savings rate to
determine damages. App. Br. at 40. Such a suggestion is without basis and requires this
Court to determine that the trial court's factual findings concerning damages were clearl]
erroneous. See State v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611, 617 (Utah 2002).
Madsens5 reliance on Derenco, 557 P.2d 427 to support their "short-cut"
argument is misplaced. In Derenco, the trial court, as finder of fact, adopted the
passbook savings rate to measure damages. The Oregon appellate court did not overrule
the trial court's factual determination of damages. Id In our case, the trial court
determined damages at trial based on assumptions concerning Prudential's expenses anc
income, as advocated by Madsens' expert at trial. See R. 3000. Madsens' "short-cut"
argument asks the appellate court to overrule the trial court's factual findings based on
so. At a hearing on January 15,2003, the trial court ordered Prudential to make all of tl
relevant loan cards available to Madsens' counsel and then set another hearing after
Madsens had had an opportunity to conduct their review. R. 13913 at 12-13. Although
Madsens made appointments to do so, Madsens voluntarily cancelled those appointed]
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the age of the case. The trial court's factual findings should not be overruled, unless
clearly erroneous. Madsens have not met this burden.
vn.

CONCLUSION

Madsens' appeal should be denied. Prudential's cross-appeal should be granted,
and Madsens' claims dismissed based on federal regulations that bar Madsens' claims.
DATED this V° day of May, 2007.
MOYLE& DRAPER
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and
RAY QUINNEY and NEBEKER P.C.
Stephen C. Tingey^
Elaina M. Maragakis
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without explanation, stating only that "we don't need to go down there [to review the
loan cards]." R. 12359.
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Chapter V—Federal Home Loan Bank Board
addition thereto of section 14.1 and any
Federal association which has a charter
in any other form not inconsistent with
the provisions of §§545.6 to 545.6-13,
may, when authorized by its board of
directors, make any loan after a qualified
person designated by such board of directors shall "have submitted a signed
appraisal of the real estate security and
may make any insured or guaranteed
loan on the basis of a valuation of the
Teal estate security furnished to such
Pederal association by the insuring or
guaranteeing agency.
[23 FJR. 9901, Dec. 23,1958]

§ 545.6-10

Initial loan charges.

No director, officer, or employee of a
Federal association, and no person or
firm regularly serving such association
in the capacity of attorney-at-law, may
receive from the association or from any
other source any fee or other compensation of any kind in connection with the
procuring of any particular loan from or
by such association. Borrowers may be
required to pay the necessary Initial
charges in connection with the making of
a loan, including the actual costs of title
examination, appraisal, credit report,
survey, drawing of papers, closing of the
loan, and other necessary incidental
services and costs in such reasonable
amounts as may be fixed by the board of
directors; such necessary initial charges
may be collected by the association from
the borrower and paid to any persons,
including any such director, officer, employee, attorney or firm rendering such
services: Provided, That no discount, rebate, or commission on any such charge
may be received by any director, officer,
or employee of a Federal association, or
by any person or firm regularly serving
such association in the capacity of attorney-at-law, but such discounts, rebates,
or commissions, when allowed as compensation for services performed, may be
received and retained by the association.
Upon the closing of the loan, the association shall furnish the borrower a loan
settlement statement showing in detail
the charges or fees the borrower has
paid or obligated himself to pay to the
association or to any other person in
connection with such loan; and a copy of
such loan settlement statement shall be
retained in the records of the association.
[23 FJR. 9901, Dec. 23,1958]
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§ 545.6—11

§545.6-11

Loan contract*

(a) Required and authorized provisions; Each loan shall be evidenced by
note, bond, or other instrument and shall
be secured by such security instrument
as is in keeping with sound lending practices. The loan contract shall provide for
full protection to the Federal association
in accordance with applicable provisions
of law, applicable governmental rules and
regulations, and the Federal association's
charter and bylaws. It shall be recorded
and, among other protections, it shall
provide specifically for full protection
with respect to insurance, taxes, assessments, other governmental levies, maintenance, and repairs. It may provide for
an assignment of rents. Such Federal association may pay taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, and other similar
charges for the protection of its interest
in the property on which it has loans; all
such payments may, when consistent
with the provisions of this part, be added
to the unpaid balance of the loan, A Federal association may require life insurance to be assigned to it by its borrowers
as additional collateral for loans on the
security of real estate; such association
may advance premiums on any such life
insurance and, when consistent with the
provisions of this part, may add the
premium so advanced to the unpaid balance of the loan. A Federal association
shall keep a record of the status of taxes,
assessments, insurance premiums, and
other charges on all real estate on which
such association has loans or which is
owned by it. All loan instruments shall
comply with applicable provisions of
law, applicable governmental rules and
regulations, and the Federal association's
charter and bylaws.
(b) Escrow accounts. A Federal association may require that all or any portion of the estimated annual taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, and
other charges on any loan be paid in advance to such association in addition to
interest and principal payments on such
loan, to enable the association to pay
such charges as they become due from
the funds so received. With regard to any
loan on the security of a home made in
whole or in part by the association, the
association shall not require that the
borrower—
(1) Deposit in any escrow account
which may be established in connection
with such loan for the purpose of assuring payment of taxes, assessments, in-
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§ 545.6-12

Title 12—Banks and Banking

surance premiums, and other charges
with respect to the property, prior to or
upon the date of settlement, an aggregate sum for such purpose in excess
of—
(i) m any jurisdiction where such
charges are postpaid, the total amount
of such charges which will actually be
due and payable on the date of settlement and the pro rata portion thereof
which has accrued, plus one-twelfth of
the estimated total amount of such
charges which will become due and payable during the twelve-month period
beginning on the date of settlement, or
(ii) In any jurisdiction where such
charges are prepaid, a pro rata portion of
the estimated charges corresponding to
the number of months from the last date
of payment to the date of settlement, plus
one-twelfth of the estimated total
amount of such charges which will become due and payable during the twelvemonth period beginning on the date of
settlement; or
(2) Deposit in any such escrow account in any month beginning after the
date of settlement a sum (for the purpose of assuring payment of such
charges) in excess of one-twelfth of the
total amount of the estimated charges
which will become due and payable during the twelve-month period beginning
on the first day of such month, except
that in the event the association determines there will be a deficiency on the
due date it may require additional
monthly deposits in such escrow account
of pro rata portions of the deficiency corresponding to the number of months
from the date of the association's determination of such deficiency to the date
upon which such charges become due and
payable.
(c) Payment of interest on escrow accounts. A Federal association which
makes a loan on or after June 16, 1975
on the security of a single-family dwelling occupied or to be occupied by the
borrower (except such a loan for which
a bona fide commitment was made before that date) shall pay interest on any
escrow account maintained in connection
with such a loan (1) if there is in effect a
specific statutory provision or provisions
of the State in which such dwelling is
located by or under which State-chartered savings and loan associations,
mutual savings banks and similar institutions are generally required to pay in-
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terest on such escrow accounts, and (2)
at not less than the rate required to be
paid by such State-chartered institutions
but not to exceed the rate being paid by
the Federal association in its regular accounts (as defined in § 526.1 of this chapter). Except as provided by contract, a
Federal association shall have no obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts
apart from the duties imposed by this
paragraph.
[40 FR 20942, May 14, 1975]

§ 545.6-12

Loan payments.

(a) Payments on monthly installment
loans and flexible payment loans. Payments on all monthly Installment loans
and flexible payment loans, other than
construction loans, insured loans, and
guaranteed loans, shall begin not later
than 60 days after the advance of the
loan. Insured loans and guaranteed loans
may be repayable upon terms acceptable
to the Insuring or guaranteeing agency.
The Board hereby approves for use by
any Federal association a loan plan
whereby payments on any monthly installment loan or flexible payment loan
which includes construction may begin
not later than 36 months after the date
of thefirstadvance, but not later than 18
months If the loan is secured by real
estate consisting solely of one or more
homes or combination of home and business property; interest shall be payable
at least semiannually until regular periodic payments become due.
(b) Loan payments and prepayments.
Payments on the principal Indebtedness
of all loans on real estate security shall
be applied directly to the reduction of
such indebtedness, but prepayments
made on an installment loan may be
reapplied from time to time in whole or
in part by a Federal association to
offset payments which subsequently accrue under the loan contract. Each borrower from Federal associations on a
loan secured by a home or combination
of home and business property shall have
the right to prepay the loan without
penalty unless the loan contract makes
express provision for a prepayment
penalty. The prepayment penalty for a
loan secured by a home which is occupied
or to be occupied in whole or in part by a
borrower shall not be more than 6
months' advance interest on that part of
the aggregate amount of all prepayments
made on such loan in any 12-month
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§541.1

Sec.
541.16
Guaranteed loan.
541.18
Director.
AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Fart 541
Issued under sec. 5,48 Stat. 182, aa amended;
12 UJ3.C. 1464, Reorg. Plan No. 8 at 1947; 8
GFR, 1943-1948 Coxnp.

§ 541.1 Board..
The term "Board" means the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board or one or more
of its officials who has been duly authorized by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board to act in its behalf.
[23 FJEt. 9890, Dee. 23, 1958]
§ 541.2

Insurance premiums, or both, in connection with a loan on the security of a lien
on real estate.
[23 FJEt. 9890, Dee. 23, 1958]
§ 541.6

Withdrawal value.

The term "withdrawal value" means
the amount paid on a savings account in
a Federal association, plus earnings
credited thereto, less lawful deductions
therefrom.
[23 FJL 9890, Dec. 23, 1958]
§ 541.7

General reserves.

The term "general reserves" means the
aggregate amount of reserves of a Federal association established by such association for the sole purpose of meeting
losses.

Federal association.

The term "Federal association" means
a Federal savings and loan association
chartered by the Board as provided In [23 FJ&. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958]
section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933, as amended. As used in § 541.8 Surplus.
§§ 546.1, 546.2, 546.3, and 546.4 of Fart
The term "surplus" means the undis546, and in Parts 547, 548, 549, and 550 of tributed earnings of a Federal associathis subchapter, the term "Federal as- tion which are held as unallocated resociation" also includes any incorporated serves for general corporate use.
or unincorporated building, building or [23 FJl. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958]
loan, building and loan, savings and § 5 4 1 . 8 - 1 N e t worth.
loan, or homestead association, which
The term "net worth" means the sum
has been organized or incorporated
under or pursuant to the laws of the Dis- of all general reserves, surplus, and any
other accounts of a Federal association
trict of Columbia.
which may be designated as part of net
(33 FJEt. 10523, July 24, 1968]
worth pursuant to the provisions of this
§ 541.3 Capital.
subchapter.
The term "capital"- means the aggre- [37FJR. 12931, June 30,1972]
gate of the payments on savings ac- § 5 4 1 . 9 Loans o n the security o f first
counts in a Federal association, plus
liens.
earnings credited thereto, less lawful de(a) The term "loans on the security
ductions therefrom.
of
first liens" means loans on the secu[23 FJEt. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958]
rity of any instrument (whether a mortgage, deed of trust, or land contract)
§ 5 4 1 . 4 Savings account*
which
makes the interest in the real esThe term "savings account" means the tate described
therein (whether in fee
monetary interest of the holder thereof or
In
a
leasehold
or subleasehold exin the capital of a Federal association tending or renewable
automatically or
and consists of the withdrawal value of at the option of the holder
(or at the
such interest.
option of the Federal association) for
[23 F.R. 9890, Dec. 23, 1958]
a period of at least 10 years beyond the
maturity of the loan) specific security
§ 541*5 Short-term savings accountfor the payment of the obligation seThe term "short-fcerat savings account" cured
by such instrument: Provided, The
means a savings account in a Federal instrument is of such nature that, in the
association which is to be withdrawn event of default, the real estate described
in less than twenty-four months from in such instrument could be subjected
the date on which such account is to the satisfaction of such obligation
opened, or a savings account In a Federal with the same priority as a first mortassociation established for the purpose gage or a first deed of trust in the jurisof accumulating funds to pay taxes or diction where the real estate Is located.
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mediately thereafter the board of directors shall meet, elect officers, and transact such other business as may be necessary and proper.

approval of its members as provided In
this section.
§ 543.11

Formal application*

(a) Farm. Upon approval by its members of the plan of conversion, as provided in § 543.10, the applicant may file
its formal application for conversion
into a Federal association in form prescribed by the Board. (The Board has
prescribed a form of "Application for
Conversion into a Federal Association",
copies of which may be obtained from
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Washington, D.C., or from any Federal
home loan bank.)
(b) Filing. The formal application
for conversion into a Federal association
shall befiledin duplicate with the Board
through the Federal home loan bank of
which the applicant is or proposes to
become a member; such application shall
be accompanied by evidence satisfactory
to the Board showing compliance by the
applicant with all conditions prescribed
by the Board in its approval of the preliminaiy application for conversion Into
a Federal association and, unless the
applicant is insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, by
formal application for insurance of
accounts.
(c) Issuance of charter. No formal
application for conversion into a Federal
association will be approved by the Board
unless the applicant shall have been approved for membership in a Federal
home loan bank. Upon approval by the
Board of a formal application for conversion into a Federal association, the
Board will issue a Charter, as provided
in § 544.1 of this subchapter; conversion
into a Federal association is completed
upon the issuance of such charter and
upon compliance with all relevant requirements of law, if any, which expressly provide for such conversion.
§ 543*12

[27F.R. 5S91, June 7.1982]

PART 544—CHARTER AND BYLAWS
CHASIXB

Sec.
544.1
* 544.2
544.3

Organization after conversion.

Upon Issuance of a Federal charter, as
provided in § 543.11, a legal meeting of
the members of such Federal association
shall be held promptly, after due notice
unless held upon a valid adjournment of
a previous legal meeting. At such meeting directors shall be elected and such
other action shall be taken as is necessary fully to carry into effect the conversion as approved by the Board and
to operate such Federal association In
accordance with the law and the rules
and regulations in this subchapter. Im-
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544.4

Issuance of charter.
Pending applications.
Adoption of Charter N or Charter K
(rev.).
Evidence of corporate existence.
BYLAWS

644.5 Prescribed form.
544.6 Amendment to bylaws.
544.6-1 Preparedness emergency
ments to bylaws.

amend-

AVAZLABILXTY

544.7
544.8

In offices of association.
Amendment of Charter.
AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Part 544
Issued under sec. 5, 48 Stat. 182, as amended;
12 TJ.S.C. 1464, Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1947; 8
CFR, 1943-1948 Comp.
SOURCE: The provisions of this Part 544
appear at 23 FJEL 9893, Dec. 28, 1958, unless
otherwise noted.
CHARTER

§ 544.1 Issuance of charter*
(a) Charter N. Except as provided
In paragraph (b) of this section and in
§ 544.2, the following form of charter,
which shall be known as Charter N, will
be Issued on and after the effective date
of the rules and regulations in this subchapter, upon approval by the Board of
any petition for a charter for a Federal
association pursuant to the provisions of
subsections (a) or (1) of section 5 of
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as
amended:
CHARTER N

1. Corporate title. The full corporate title
of the Federal association hereby chartered
Is
Federal
Savings and Loan Association
.
2. Office. The home office shall he located
at
, in the County of
, State of
3. Object* and powers. The objects of the
association are to promote thrift by providing
a convenient and safe method for people to
save and Invest money and to provide for the
sound and economical financing of homes;
and, In the accomplishment of such objects,
It shall have perpetual succession and power:
(1) To act as fiscal agent of the United States
when designated for that purpose by the
Secretary of the Treasury, under such regulations as he may prescribe, and shall perform
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§544.1

all such reasonable duties as fiscal agent of
be members prior to such meeting shall not
the United States as he may require and to
be entitled to vote thereat. All savlngp
act as agent for any other Instrumentality of
accounts shall be nonassessable.
the United States when designated for that
5. Directors. The association shall be under
purpose by any such instrumentality; (2) To
the direction of a board of directors of
Bue and be sued, complain and defend In any
not less than 5 nor more than 15, as fixed
court of law or equity; (8) To have a corIn the association's bylaws or, In the absence
porate seal, affixed by Imprint* facsimile or
of any such bylaw provision, as from time to
otherwise; (4) To appoint afflcers and agents
time expressly determined by resolution of
as Its business shall require, and allow them
the association's members. Each director of
suitable compensation; (5) To adopt bylaws
the association shall be a member of the asnot Inconsistent with the Constitution or
sociation, and a director shall cease to be a
laws of the United States and rules and regudirector when he ceases to be a member.
lations adopted thereunder and this charter;
Directors of the association shall be elected
(6) To raise Its capital, which shall be unby its members by ballot; Provided, That in
limited, by accepting payments on savings
•the event of a vacancy in the directorate, Inacounts representing share Interests in the
cluding vacancies created by an Increase in
association; (7) To borrow money; (8) To
the number of directors, the board of direclend and otherwise invest Its funds; (9) To
tors may fill such vacancy. If the members
wind up and dissolve, merge, consolidate,
of the association fall so to do, by electing a
convert, or reorganize; (10) To purchase
director to serve until the next annual meethold, and convey real and personal estate
ing of the members. Directors shall be
consistent with Its objects, purposes, and
elected for periods of 3 years and until their
powers; (11) To mortgage or lease any real
successors are elected and qualified, but proand personal estate and take such property
vision shall be made for the election of apby gift, devise, or bequest; and (12) To exerproximately one-third of the board of direccise all powers conferred by law. In addition tors each year.
to the foregoing powers expressly enumerated*
6. "Withdrawals. The association shall
this association shall have power to do all
have the right to pay the withdrawal value
things reasonably Incident to the accomplishof Its savings accounts at any time upon
ment of Its express objects and the performapplication therefor and to pay the holders
ance of Its express powers. It shall exercise
thereof the withdrawal value thereof. Upon
Its powers In conformity with all laws of the
receipt of a written request from any holder
United States as they now are, or as they may
of a savings account of the association for
hereafer be amended, and with all rules and
the withdrawal from such account of all .or
regulations which are not In conflict with this any part of the withdrawal value thereof,
charter, now or hereafter made thereunder.
the association shall within 30 days pay the
4. Members. All holders of the associaamount requested; Provided, That if the astion's savings accounts and all borrowers
sociation is unable to pay all withdrawals
therefrom are members. In the considerarequested at the end of 30 days from the
tion of all questions requiring action by the
date of such requests, it shall then pay all
members of the association, each holder of
withdrawals requested In accordance with
a savings account shall be permitted to cast
such methods and procedures as to amounts
one vote for each $100, or fraction thereof,
and allotments of funds for such purposes
of the withdrawal value of his account. A
as shall be provided' In regulations made by
borrowing member shall be permitted, as a
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board In effect
borrower, to cast one vote, and to cast the
at the date of the request for withdrawal.
number of votes to which he may be entitled
Holders of savings accounts for which appli-*
as the holder of a savings account. No memcation for withdrawal has been made shall
ber, however, shall cast more than 50 votes.
remain holders of savings accounts until paid
Voting may be by proxy. Any number of
and shall not become creditors.
members present at a regular or special
7. Redemption. At any time sufficient
meeting of the members shall constitute a
funds are on hand, the association shall have,
quorum. A majority of all votes cast at
the right to redeem, by lot or otherwise as
any meeting of members shall determine
the board of directors may determine, all or
any question. The members who shall be
any part of any of its savings accounts on
entitled to vote at any meeting of the memJune 30 or December 31, by giving 30 days'
bers Bhall be those owning savings accounts
notice of such redemption by registered mall
and borrowing members of record on the
addressed to the holder of each such savings
books of the association at the end of the
account at his last address as recorded on the
calendar month next preceding the date of
books of the association. The association
such meeting. The number of votes which
may not redeem any of its savings accounts
each member shall be entitled to cast at
when there Is an impairment of Its capital
any meeting of the members shall be deteror when It has any request for withdrawal
mined from the books of the association as
which has been on file and unpaid for more
of the end of the calendar month next prethan 30 days. The redemption price of each
ceding the date of such meeting. Those who
savings account redeemed shall be the full
were members at the end of the calendar
value thereof, as determined by the board of
month next preceding the date of a meeting
directors, but In no event shall the redempof members but who shall have ceased to
tion price be less than the withdrawal
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amount of such savings account. If a savings account which Is redeemed Is entitled
to participate In any reserve for bonus, the
amount In such reserve for bonus which Is
properly allocable to such savlngB account
shall be paid as part of the redemption price
thereof. If any notice of redemption shall
have been duly given, and If the funds necessary for such redemption shall have been
set aside so as to be and to continue to be
available for that purpose, earnings upon
such account shall cease to accrue from and
after the date specified as the redemption
date and all rights with respect to each such
account shall forthwith, after such redemption date, terminate, except only the right
of the holder of record of such savings
account to receive the redemption price
there of without earnings,
8. Loans and investments. The association may make any loan or Investment authorized by statute and the rules and regulations made by the Home Loan Bank Board
and in effect on August 15,1949; it may make
such additional loans and investments as
may thereafter be authorized by amendments
of the said rules and regulations.
9. Power to borrow. The association may
borrow money In an aggregate amount not
exceeding one-half of Its capital; the amount
which may be borrowed from sources other
than a Federal home loan bank shall not
exceed one-tenth of such capital. Notwithsanding the foregoing limitations, the association may, with prior approval by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, borrow from a
Federal home loan bank or from any Federal
agency or instrumentality without limitation, upon such terms and conditions as may
be required by such bank or agency. The
association may pledge and otherwise encumber any of Its assets to secure its debts.
10. Reserves, surplus, and distribution of
earnings. The association shall maintain
general reserves for the sole purpose of meeting losses; such reserves shall Include the
reserve required for insurance of accounts.
Any losses may be charged against general
reserves. If and whenever the general reserves of the association are not equal to at
least 10 percent of Its capital. It shall, as of
June SO and December 31 of each year, credit
to such reserves an amount equivalent to at
least 5 percent of Its net earnings for the 6
months' period, or such amount as may be
required by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, whichever is greater,
until such reserves are equal to, at least 10
percent of the association's capital. As of
June SO and December 31 of each year, after
payment or provision for payment of all expenses, credits to general reserves and such
credits to surplus as the board of directors
may determine, and provision for bonus on
savings accounts as authorized by regulations
made by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
the board of directors of the association shall
cause the remainder of the net earnings of
the association for the 6 months' period to be
distributed promptly on its savings accounts,
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ratably, as declared by the board of directors,
to the withdrawal value thereof; in lieu of or
in addition to such net earnings, any of the
association's surplus funds may be likewise
distributed. Such net earnings shall be credited to savlngB accounts or paid, as directed
by the owner. All holders of savings accounts
shall participate at the same rate and on the
same basis in the distribution of earnings:
Provided, That the association is not required
to distribute earnings on short-term savings
accounts or on a c c o u n t s of $10 or less.
Except as provided, above, earnings shall be
declared on all savings accounts of record at
the close of each such 6 months' period, on
the withdrawal value of each such account
at the beginning of the said 6 months' period,
plus the payments made thereon during such
period (less amounts withdrawn, and, for
purposes of participation In earnings, deducted from the latest previous payments),
computed at the declared rate for the time
invested, determined as provided below. The
date of Investment shall be the date of actual
receipt of such payments by the association,
unless the board of directors fixes a date, not
later than the tenth of the month, for determining the date of investment of payments
on savings accounts or designated classes
thereof. Payments, affected by such determination date, received by /the association
on or before such determination date shall
receive earnings as if invested on the first of
such month. Payments, affected by such determination date, received subsequent to
such determination date shall receive earnings as if Invested on the first of the next
succeeding month. Notwithstanding any
other provision of its charter, the association
may distribute net earnings on its savings
accounts on such other basis and in accordance with such other terms and conditions
as may from time to time be authorized by
regulations made by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board. All holders of savings accounts
of the association shall be entitled to equal
distribution of assets, pro rata to the value of
their savings accounts, in the event of voluntary or Involuntary liquidation, dissolution,
or winding up of the association.
11. Amendment of charter. No amendment,
addition, alteration, change, or repeal of thlB
charter shall be made unless such proposal
Is made by the board of directors of the association, and submitted to and approved by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and is
thereafter submitted to and approved by the
members at a legal meeting. Any amendment, addition, alteration, change, or repeal
so acted upon and approved shall be effective,
if filed with and approved by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, as of the date of the
final approval of, or as fixed by, the members.
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD,

By
(Chairman)
Attest:
(Secretary)
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ation of all questions requiring action by the
members of the association, each holder of
a savings account shall be permitted to cast
one vote for each $100, or fraction thereof,
of the withdrawal value of his account. A
borrowing member shall be permitted, as a
borrower, to cast one vote, and to cast the
number of votes to which he may be entitled
CHAETEE K (REV.)
as the holder of a savings account. No
1. Corporate title. The fuU corporate title member, however, shall cast more than 50
of the Federal association hereby chartered votes. Voting may be by proxy. Any number of members present at a regular or
is
Federal Savings and Loan Assospecial meeting of the members shall consticiation
tute a quorum. A majority of all votes cast
2. Office. The home office shall be located
at any meeting of members shall determine
at
, in the County of
, any
question. The members who shall be
State of
entitled to vote at any meeting of the mem3. Objects and powers. The objects of the
bers shall be those owning savings accounts
association are to promote thrift by providand borrowing members of record on the
ing a convenient and safe method for people
of the association at the end of the
to save and invest money and to provide for books
calendar month next preceding the date of
the sound and economical financing of
such meeting. The number of votes which
homes; and, In the accomplishment of such
each member shall be entitled to cast at any
objects, It shall have perpetual succession
meeting of the members shall be determined
and power: (1) To act as fiscal agent of the from the books of the association as of the
United States when designated for that purend of the calendar' month next preceding
pose by the Secretary of the Treasury, under
the date of such meeting. Those who were
such regulations as he may prescribe, and
members at the end of the calendar month
shall perform all such reasonable duties as
next preceding the date of a meeting of memfiscal agent of the United States as he may
bers but who shall have ceased to be memrequire and to act as agent for any other
bers, prior to such meeting shall not be
instrumentality of the United States when
entitled to vote thereat. All savings accounts
designated for that purpose by any such
shall be nonassessable.
instrumentality; (2) To sue and be sued,
5. Directors. The association shall be
complain and defend In any court of law or
under
the direction of a board of directors
equity; (3) To have a corporate seal, affixed
of not less than 5 nor more than 15, as fixed
by Imprint, facsimile or otherwise; (4) To
in the association's bylaws or, In the absence
appoint officers and agents as its business
of any such bylaw provision, as from time
shall require, and allow them suitable comto time expressly determined by resolution
pensation; (5) To adopt bylaws not Inconof the association's members. Each director
sistent with the Constitution or laws of the
of the association 6ha!l be a member of the
United States and rules and regulations
association, and a director shall cease to be
adopted thereunder and this charter; (6) To
a director when he ceases to be a member.
raise its capital, which shall be unlimited, Directors of the association shall be elected
by accepting payments on savings accounts
by its members by ballot: Provided, That in
representing share Interests In the associathe event of a vacancy In the directorate,
tion; (7) To borrow money; (8) To lend and; including vacancies created by an Increase
otherwise Invest Its funds; (9) To wind up- in the number of directors, the board of
end dissolve, merge, consolidate, convert,
directors may fill such vacancy, if the memor reorganize; (10) To purchase, hold, and
bers of the association fail so to do, by
convey real and personal estate consistent
electing a director to serve until the next
with its objects, purposes, and powers; (11)
ariTiual meeting of the members. Directors
To mortgage or lease any real and personal
shall be elected for periods of 3 years and
estate and take such property by gift, devise, until their successors are elected and qualior bequest; and (12) To exercise all powers fied, but provision shall be made for the
conferred by law. In addition to the foreelection of approximately one-third of the
going powers expressly enumerated, this
board of directors each year.
association shall have power to do all things
6. Withdrawals. The association shall have
reasonably Incident to the accomplishment
the right to pay the withdrawal value of its
of its express objects and the performance
savings accounts at any time upon applicaof its express powers. It shall exercise its
tion therefor and to pay the holders thereof
powers in conformity with all laws of the the withdrawal value thereof. Upon receipt
United States as they now axe, or as they may of a written request from any holder of a
hereafter be amended, and with all rules and
savings account of the association for the
regulations which are not in conflict with
withdrawal from such account of all or any
this charter now or hereafter made therepart of the withdrawal value thereof, the
under.
association shall within 30 days pay the
amount requested; Provided, That If the as4. Members. All holders of the association's savings accounts and all borowers sociation Is unable to pay all withdrawals
requested at the end of 30 days from the
therefrom are members. In the consider-

(b) Charter K (rev.). If expressly
requested In the Petition for Charter, or
In the Application for Conversion into
a Federal association, the Board, In lieu
of Charter Nt will issue a Charter K
(rev.) , reading: as follows:

HeinOnline --

CFR 295 1975

§544.1

Title 12—Banks and Banking

date of such requests, It shall then proceed
in the following manner while any with*1
drawal request remains unpaid for more thai
$a d&3&\
Withdrawal requests shall be paid in th 8e
order received and if any holder of a saving
account or accounts has requested the with*
drawal of more than $1,000, he shall be paid
$1,000 in order when reached and his with"
drawal request shall be charged with sucP
amount as paid and shall be renumbered
and placed at the end of the list of with"
drawal requests, and thereafter, upon agaiA
being reached, shall be paid a like amount'.
but not exceeding the withdrawal value o*
his savings account, and until such wlth~
drawal request shall have been paid in full*
shall continue to be so paid, renumbered, and
replaced at the end of the withdrawal re'
quests on file: Provided, That when any suc£
request Is reached for payment, the associs'
tion shall so advise the holder of such s a v
ings account by registered mall to his last
address as recorded on the books of th£
association and, unless such holder shall
apply in person or in writing for the payment
of such withdrawal request within 80 day?
from the date of the mailing of such notice*
no payment on account of such withdrawal
request shall be made and such request shall

of each savings account redeemed shall be
the full value thereof, as determined by the
board of directors, but in no event shall the
redemption nrlce be less than the withdrawal
amount of such savings account. If a savings account which is redeemed is entitled to
participate in any reserve for bonus, the
amount in such reserve for bonus which Is
properly allocable to such savings account
shall be paid as part of the redemption price
thereof. If any notice of redemption shall
have been duly given, and If the funds necessary for such redemption shall have been set
aside so as to be and to continue to be
available for that purpose, earnings upon
such account shall cease to accrue from and
after the date specified as the redemption
date and all rights with respect to each such
account shall forthwith, after such redemption date, terminate, except only the right of
the holder of record of such savings account
to receive the redemption price thereof without earnings.
8. Loans and investments. The association may make any loan or Investment authorized by statute and the rules and
regulations made by the Home Loan Bank
Board and in effect on August 15, 1949; it
may make such additional loans and investments as may thereafter be authorized by

board of directors shall have absolute right
to pay on an equitable basis an amount not
exceeding $200 to any holder of a saving*
account or accounts in any calendar montH
and without regard to any other provision
of this section.
When the association is unable to pay all
withdrawal requests within a period not ex"
ceedlng SO days from the date of receipt of
written request therefor it shall allot to th0
payment of such requests the remainder of
the association's receipts from all source*
after deducting from total receipts appropriate amounts for expenses, required p a y
ments on indebtedness, earnings distributa'
ble in cash to holders of savings account**
and a fund for general corporate purpose*
equivalent to not more than 20 percent of
the association's receipts from holders of it*
savings accounts and from its borrowers*
Holders of savings accounts for which appll'
cation for withdrawal has been made shall
remain holders of savings accounts until
paid and shall not become creditors.
7. Redemption. At any time sufficient
funds are on hand, the association shall

tions.
9. Power to borrow. The association may
borrow money in an aggregate amount not
exceeding one-half of Its capital; the amount
which may be borrowed from sources other
than a Federal home loan bank shall net
exceed one-tenth of such capital. Notwithstanding the foregoing limitations, the association may, with prior approval by. the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, borrow from
a Federal home loan bank or from any Federal agency or Instrumentality without limitation, upon such terms and conditions as
may be required by such bank or agency.
The association may pledge and otherwise
encumber any of its assets to secure its
debts.
10. Reserves, surplus, and distribution of
earnings. The association shall maintain
general reserves for the sole purpose of
meeting losses; such reserves shall include
the reserve required for insurance of accounts. Any losses may be charged against
general reserves. If and whenever the general reserves of the association are not equal
to at least 10 percent of Its capital, it shall,

as the board of directors may determine, all
or any part of any of Its savings accounts on
June 30 or December 31, by giving 30 days'
notice of such redemption by registered mail
addressed to the holder of each such saving*
account at his last address as recorded on
the books of the association. The association may not redeem any of Its savings a c
counts when there is an Impairment of it*
capital or when it has any request for withdrawal which has been on file and unpaid lof
more than 30 days. The redemption pric*

year, credit to such reserves an amount
equivalent to at least 6 percent of its net
earnings for the 6 months' period, or such
amount as may be required by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,
whichever Is greater, until such reserves are
equal to at least lb percent of the association's capital. As of June 30 and December 31 of each year, after payment or provision for. payment of all expenses, credits
to general reserves and such credits to surplus as the board of directors may deter-
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mine, and provision for bonus on savings Shall be effective, if filed with and approved
accounts as authorized by regulations made by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, as of
by the Federal Home loan Bank Board, the the date of the final approval of, or as fixed
by, the members.
board of directors of the association shall
cause the remainder of the net earnings of
FRDTCBAT. HOME LOAN BANK. BOABD,
the association for the 6 months' period to be
By ™
....
distributed promptly on Its savings ac(Chairman)
counts, ratably, as declared by the board
Attest:
of directors, to the withdrawal value thereof;
In lieu of or in addition to such net earn(Secretary)
ings, any of the association's surplus funds
may be likewise distributed. Such net earn- § 544.2 Pending applications.
ings shall be credited to savings accounts
All pertinent provisions of Part 542 of
or paid, as directed by the owner. All
this subchapter in effect prior to the efholders of savings accounts shall participate
at the same rate and on the same basis fective date hereof shall remain in full
in the distribution of earnings: Provided, force and effect as to any formal applicaThat the association Is not required to distions made prior to such date for pertribute earnings on short-term savings acmission to organize a Federal association
counts or on accounts of $10 or less. Except
under the provisions of section 5(a), or
as provided above, earnings shall be declared
on all savings accounts of record at the to convert to a Federal association under
the provisions of section 5(i), of the
close of each such 6 months' period, on
the withdrawal value of each such account
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as
at the beginning of the said 6 months'
amended.
period, plus the payments made thereon
during such period (less amounts with- § 544,3 Adoption
terK (rev.).
drawn, and, for purposes of participation
In earnings, deducted from the latest preA Federal association that has a Charvious payments), computed at the declared
rate for the time invested, determined as ter E or a Charter K may mend such
provided below. The date of investment charter in its entirety to read in the form
of Charter N or Charter K (rev.) t by mashall be the date of actual receipt of such
payments by the association, unless the jority vote of such association's members
board of directors fixes a date, not later present at any duly called regular or spethan the tenth of the month, for detercial meeting of members and the memmining the date of investment of payments bers of a Charter N Federal association
on savings accounts or designated classes
thereof. Payments, affected by such deter- may similarly amend such association's
mination date, received by the association charter in its entirety to read in the form
on or before such determination date, shall of Charter K (rev.): Provided, That, in
receive earnings as If Invested on the first the case of a Federal association that has
of such month. Payments, affected by such
a Charter K or Charter N, the board of
determination date, received subsequent to directors of such association shall first
such determination date, shall receive have proposed such amendment, and the
earnings as if Invested on the first of the provisions of this section shall be deemed
next succeeding month. Notwithstanding
to be the approval by the Board of such
any other provision of Its charter, the association may distribute net earnings on its proposal. Upon receipt of the following
savings accounts on such other basis and petition from a Federal association that
in accordance with such other terms and has amended its charter as provided in
conditions as may from time to time be this section, the Board will issue to such
authorized by regulations made by the FedFederal association, as requested by it a
eral Home Loan Bank Board. All holders of
savings accounts of the association shall be Charter N or a Charter K (rev.) in the
entitled to equal distribution of assets, pro same name and showing the same locarata to the value of their savings accounts, in tion of home office as is prescribed in
such association's present charter, unless
the event of voluntary or Involuntary liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the the Board when petitioned approves a
association.
change in such name or location:
11, Amendment of charter. No amend- FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOABD,
ment, addition, alteration, change, or repeal
Washington, D.C.
of this charter shall be made unless such
proposal Is made by the board of directors
The undersigned, pursuant to 8 544.3 of
of the association, and submitted to and
the rules and regulations for the Federal
approved by the Federal Home Loan Bank Savings and Loan System, respectfully petiBoard, and is thereafter submitted to and
tions the Board to issue an amended charter
approved by the members at a legal meeting. in the form of Charter (Insert "N" or "K.
Any amendment, a d d i t i o n , alteration,
(rev.)'% as voted by the members), to the
change, or repeal so acted upon and approved undersigned, fixing the name and home office
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of the undersigned which its present charter
prescribes.
The undersigned, by Its secretary, hereby
certifies that the members at a meeting duly
called and held adopted the following resolution:
Be it resolved, That the present charter of
this association be amended to read in the
form of Charter (insert "N" or "K (rev.)",
as voted by the members) as set forth in
§ 544.1 of the rules and regulations for the
Federal Savings and Loan System, prescribing the present name and home office fixed
by the present charter of this association.
In witness whereof, the Secretary of the
undersigned has hereunto affixed his hand
and the seal of the undersigned this
day of
, 19
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION
[CORPORATE SEAL J B y

,

§544*4 Evidence
ence*

nl

corporate

exist-

The issuance of a charter to a Federal
association shall constitute the Incorporation of such Federal association by the
Board; the charter of a Federal association, or a certified copy thereof under
the seal of the Board, shall be evidence
of the corporate existence of such Federal association.
BYLAWS

§ 544*5

Prescribed form.

A Federal association that has a
Charter N or Charter K (rev.) shall operate under the following prescribed bylaws, unless and until such bylaws are
amended in accordance with the procedure therein set forth:
1. Annual meetings of members. The annual meeting of the members of the association for the election of directors and for
the transaction of any other business of the
association shall he held at Its home office
at 2 o'clock In .the afternoon on the third
Wednesday In January of each-year, If not a
legal holiday* or If a legal holiday then on
the next succeeding day not a legal holiday.
The annual meeting may be held at such
other time on such day or at such other place
in t&fe same community *s -tha \>oax& oi
directors may determine. At each annual
meeting, the officers shall make a full report of the financial condition of the association and of Its progress for the preceding
year, and shall outline a program for the succeeding year. Annual meetings of the members shall be conducted in accordance with
Roberts' Rules of Order.
2. Special meetings of members. Special
meetings of the members of the association
may be called at any time by the president
or the board of directors, and shall be caUed
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by the president, a vice president, or the
secretary upon the written request of members holding of record In the aggregate at
least one-tenth of the capital of the association. Such written request shall state the
purposes of the meeting and shall be delivered at the home office of the association
addressed to the president. Special meetings
of the members shaU be conducted in accordance with Roberts' Rules of Order.
3. Notice of meeting of members, (a) Notice
of each annual meeting shall be either published once a wees: for the two successive
calendar weeks {in each-instance on any day
of the week) Immediately prior to the week
in which such annual meeting shall convene, In a newspaper printed In the English
language and of general circulation in the
city or county in which the home office of
the association is located or mailed postage
prepaid at least (insert number not less than
15) days and not more than (Insert number
not more than 45) days prior to the date on
which such annual meeting shall convene to
each of Its members of record at his last
address appearing on the books of the association. Such notice shall state the name of
the association, the place of the annual meeting and the time when it shall convene. A
similar notice shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each of the offices of the association during the 14 days immediately
preceding the date on which such annual
meeting shall convene. If any member, in
person or by attorney thereunto authorized,
shall waive in writing notice of any annual
meeting of members, notice thereof need not
be given to such member.
(b) Notice of each special meeting shall
be either published once a week for the two
consecutive calendar weeks (In each Instance
on any day of the week) Immediately prior
to the week in which such special meeting
shall convene, in a newspaper printed In the
English language and of general circulation
in the city or county In which the home office of the association Is located, or mailed
postage prepaid at least (insert number not
less than 15) days and not more than (insert
number not more than 45) days prior to the
date on which such special meeting shaU
convene to each of its members of record at
his last address appearing on the books of
the association. Such notice shall state the
name of the association, the purpose or purposes for which the meeting is called, the
place of the special meeting and the time
when i t shaft convene. A Binmar notice shall
be posted in a conspicuous place in each of
the offices of the association during the 14
days immediately preceding the date on
which such special meeting shall convene. If
any member, in person or by attorney thereunto authorized, shall waive in writing notice
of any special meeting of members, notice
thereof need not be given to such member.
4. Meetings of the board of directors. The
board of directors shall meet regularly without notice at the home office of the assocla-
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tlon at least once each month at the hour
and date fixed by resolution of the board
of directors, provided that the place of meeting may be changed by the directors. Special
meetings of the board of directors may be
held at any place in the territory in which
the association may make loans specified in
a notice of such meeting and shall be called
by the secretary upon the written request
of the president, or of three .directors. All
special meetings shall be held upon at least
8 days' written notice to each director unless
notice be waived in writing before or after
such meeting. Such notice shall state the
place, time, and purposes of such meeting.
A majority of the directors shall constitute
a quorum for the transaction of business.
The act of a majority of the directors present
at any meeting at which there is a quorum
Bhall be the act of the board of directors.
All meetings of the board of directors shall
be conducted in accordance with Koberts*
Rules of Order.
5. Officers, employees, and agents. Annually at the meeting of the board of directors of the association next following the
annual meeting of the members of the association, the board of directors shall elect a
president, one or more vice presidents, a secretary, and a treasurer: Provided, That the
offices of secretary and treasurer may be held
by the same person, and a vice president may
also be either the secretary or the treasurer.
The board of directors may appoint such additional officers and such employees and
agents as it may from time to time determine.
The term of office of all officers shall be one
year or until their respective successors are
elected and qualified; but any officer may be
removed at any time by the board of directors. In the absence of designation from
time to time of powers and duties by the
board of directors, the officers shall have such
powers and duties as generally pertain to
their respective offices.
6. Resignation of directors. Any director may resign at any time by sending a
written notice of such resignation to the
office of the association delivered to the secretary. Unless otherwise specified therein,
6uch resignation shall take effect upon receipt thereof by the secretary. More than
three consecutive absences from regular
meetings of the board of directors, unless excused by resolution of the board of directors,
shall automatically constitute a resignation,
effective when such resignation is accepted
by the board of directors.
7. Powers of the board. The board i>r iff
rectors shall have power—
(a) To appoint and remove by resolution
the members of an executive committee, the
members of which shall be directors, which
committee shall have and exercise the powers
of the board of directors between the meetings of the board of directors;
(b) To appoint and remove by resolution
the members of such other committees as
may be deemed necessary and prescribe the
duties thereof;
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(c) To fix the compensation of directors,
officers, and employees; and to remove any
officer or employee at any time with or without cause;
(d) To extend leniency and Indulgence to
borrowing members who axe in distress and
generally to compromise and settle any debts
and claims;
(e) To limit payments on capital which
may be accepted;
(t) To reject any application for savings
accounts or membership; and
(g) To exercise any and all of the powers
of the association not expressly reserved by
the charter to the members.
8. Execution of instruments,
generally.
All documents and instruments or writings
of any nature shall be signed, executed, verified, acknowledged, and delivered by such
officers, agents, or employees of the association or any one of them and in such manner
as from time to time may be determined by
resolution of the board of directors. All
notes, drafts, acceptances, checks, endorsements, and all evidences of indebtedness of
the association whatsoever shall be signed
by such officer or officers or such agent or
agents of the association" and in such manner as the board of directors may from time
to time determine. Endorsements for deposit to the credit of the association In any
of its duly authorized depositaries shall be
made In such manner as the board of directors may from time to time determine.
Proxies to vote with respect to shares or accounts of other associations or stock of other
corporations owned by or standing in the
name of the association may be executed
and delivered from time to time on behalf
of the association by the president or a vice
president and the secretary or an assistant
secretary of the association or by any other
person or persons thereunto authorized by
the board of directors.
9. Savings account certificates. Such officers or employees as may be designated by
the board of directors shall deliver to each
person upon the initial payment on his savings account in the association an account
boofc or other written x evidence of such
account.
10. Seah The seal shall be two concentric
circles between which shall be the name of
the association. The year of incorporation,
the word Mincorporatedw, or an emblem may
appear in the center.
11. Amendment. These bylaws may be
amended at any time by a two-thirds affirmative vote of the board of directors, or by a
vote of the members of the association.
Each and every amendment shall be subject to the approval of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, and shall be Ineffective
untU such approval shall be given: Provided,
That, without the approval of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, section l of the
bylaws may be amended .so that the time of
day ror convening the annual meeting may
be fixed at any hour not earlier than 10 *"v
or later than 9 pjn., and a section providing
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for a bonus niay be added or repealed as
provided in the rules and regulations for the
Federal Savings and Loan System.
[23 FTt 9893, Dec. 23, 1958, as amended at
38 PR 33456, Dec. 5,1973]

meeting. If at any time the president
shall fail to appoint such nominating
committee, or the nominating committee
shall fail or refuse to act at least 15 days
prior to the annual meeting, nominations for directors may be made at the
§ 544.6 Amendment to bylaws.
anual meeting by any member and shall
This section constitutes approval by be
voted upon*
the Board of any one or more of the folNew business. Any new business
lowing amendments to the bylaws of any to (b)
be
taken
up at the annual meeting,
Federal association, or of an amend- including any
proposal to increase or
ment repealing any provision of such decrease the number
directors of the
association's bylaws providing for a association, shall be of
stated
writing
bonus other than a bonus under the and filed with the secretary in
of
the
asprovisions of § 545.3 of this chapter, upon sociation on or before 30 days before the
the valid adoption of any such amend- date of the annual meeting, and all busiment by such association's directors or ness so stated, proposed andfiledshall be
members as provided in its bylaws, effec- considered at the annual meeting, but no
tive when so adopted: Provided, That the other proposal shall be acted upon at the
approval given by this section to the by- annual meeting. Any member may
law amendment set forth in paragraph make any other proposal at the annual
(e) of this section shall be applicable meeting and the same may be discussed
only to a Federal association which has and considered* but unless stated in
a charter in a form which is not incon- writing and filed with the secretary 30
sistent with the provisions of § 545.3 of days before the meeting such proposal
this chapter and which, at the time such shall be laid over for action at an adbylaw amendment becomes effective, does journed, special or regular meeting of
not have in its bylaws any other provi- the members taking place 30 days or
sion providing for the payment of a more thereafter. This provision shall
bonus on savings accounts of such not prevent the consideration and apassociation:
proval or disapproval at the annual
(a) Nominating committee. The pres- meeting of the reports of officers and
ident, at least 30 days prior to the date committees, but in connection with such
of each annual meeting, shall appoint reports no new business shall be acted
a nominating committee of three persons upon at such annual meeting unless
who are members of the association. stated and filed as herein provided.
Such committee shall make nominations
(c) Voting by proxy. Voting at any
for directors in writing, and deliver to annual or special meeting of the memthe secretary such written nominations bers may be made by proxy, it being
at least 15 days prior to the date of the provided that no proxies shall be voted
annual meeting, which nominations shall at any meeting unless such proxies shall
forthwith be posted in a prominent place have been placed on file with the secrein the home office for the 15 days* pe- tary of the association, for verification,
riod prior to the date of the annual at least 5 days prior to the date on which
meeting. Provided such committee Is such meeting shall convene.
appointed and makes such nominations,
(d) Number of directors. The numno nominations for directors except those- ber of directors of the association shall
made by the nominating committee shall be
„ _ „ __ .
be voted upon at the annual meeting un(e) Bonus on savings accounts. The
less other nominations by members are board of directors shall have exclusive
made in writing and delivered to the
to obligate the association to dissecretary of the association at least 10 power
tribute
a bonus on savings accounts, and
days prior to the date of the annual to terminate
such obligation, in accordmeeting, which nomination shall forth- ance with rules
and regulations made by
with be posted in a prominent place
the
Federal
Home
Loan Bank Board.
in the home office for the 10 days' period
(f) Bonus accounts. The association
prior to the date of the annual meeting. Ballots bearing the names of all shall be obligated to pay a bonus for
persons nominated by the nominating regular payments on savings accounts
committee and by other members prior upon the bonus plan set forth in the
to the annual meeting shall be provided rules and regulations made by the Fedfor use by the members at the annual eral Home Loan Bank Board.

« „ . , „rw,T ,,-,« __
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lbi Communications with Members.
Every member of the association shall
have the right to inspect the records of
the association which pertain solely to
his own accounts. Every member shall
have the right to communicate with other
members in relation to any matter which
may properly be considered at a meeting of members* The association may
not defeat such right by a redemption
of the member's savings account in the
association. Any member requesting a
communication with other members as
provided herein shall, not less than 30
days prior to the date of an annual meeting and not less than 10 days prior to
the date of a special meeting, furnish
the association with the following information, in writing and subscribed by
him: CI) His full name and address; (2)
the nature and extent of his interest in
the association at the time his application is made; (3) a statement of the reasons for and purposes of the communication which he desires to make with other
members; (4) a copy of such communication; and (5) the date of the annual
or special meeting of the members of
the association at which the matter will
be presented for consideration. Upon
receipt of such request, unless made for
an improper purpose, the association
shall, within 10 days of receipt in the
case of an annual meeting and within
3 days of receipt in the case of a special
meeting, notify the member either (i) of
the number of the association's members
and of the estimated amount of the association's reasonable costs and expenses
of mailing the communication to ltd
members, or (ii) of its determination not
to honor the request because the lattei
fails to comply with the provisions on
this section. After receipt of sucb
amount and sufficient copies of the mem*
ber's communication, the association
shall mail the same to all its memoers
by a class of mail specified by the requesting member within 7 days of receipt of such amount and copies In the
case of an annual meeting and at the
earliest practicable date prior to the
meeting in the case of a special meeting
(or, in either case, such later date as
the requesting member may specify).
(h) Age limitation on directors. No
person shall be eligible for election, reelection, appointment, or reappointment
to the board of directors of the association if such person is then more
than (flu in any age from 65 to 70) years
of age» No director shall serve beyond

HeinOnlme --

§ 544.6

the annual meeting of the association
immediately following his attainment of
(fill In the same age from 65 to 70 as
used above) years of age; except that any
such director serving on (fill in date of
adoption of bylaw) may complete the
unexpired portion of his term being
served on such date. This age limitation
shall not apply to a person serving a& an
advisory director of the association.
(i) Age limitation on officers. No person shall be eligible for election, reelection, appointment, or reappointment as
an officer of the association if such person is then more than (fill in any age
from 65 to 70) years of age. No officer
shall serve beyond the annual meeting
of the association immediately following his attainment of (fill in the same age
from 65 to 70 as used above) years of
age; except that any such officer serving
on (fill in date of adoption of bylaw) may
complete the unexpired portion of his
term being served on such date.
(j) Annual meeting of members. Substitute the following for section 1 of the
bylaws prescribed in § 544.5:
(1) Annual meetings of members. The
annual meeting of the members of the
association for the election of directors
and for the transaction of any other
business of the association shall be held
at its home office at 2 o'clock in the
afternoon on
(insert a date not
earlier than 15 days after the annual
closing of the association's books and
not later than 3 months and 15 days
after such closing of the association's
books) of each year, if not a Sunday or
legal holiday, or, if a Sunday or a legal
holiday, then on the next succeeding day
not a Sunday or a legal holiday. The annual meeting may be held at such other
time on such day or at such other place
in the same community as the board of
directors may determine. At each annual
meeting, the officers shall make a full
report of the financial condition of the
association and of its progress for the
preceding year, and shall outline a program for the succeeding year. Annual
meetings of the members shall be conducted in accordance with Roberts' Rules
of Order. In lieu of the date specified in
the first sentence of this subparagraph,
such annual meeting in any year may be
held on another date which is not a
Sunday or a legal holiday and which is
not earlier than 15 days after the annual
closing of the association's books and
not later than 3 months and 15 days
after such closing of the association's
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books, II ILJii" following ii'iiulrumnt •IJI
met:
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(i) The board of directors determines
the date by resolution adopted at least
2 months before the annual closing of
the books for the year preceding the
year in which the annual meeting is to
beheld; and
(ii) Notice of said date is continuously
posted in a conspicuous place in each of
the offices of the association during the
50 days immediately preceding the date
so determined.
(k) Officers, employees and agents.
Substitute the following for section 5 of
the bylaws prescribed in § 544.5:
(6) Officers, employees and agents. Annually at the meeting of the board of directors of the association next foUowlng the
annual meeting of the members of the association, the board of directors shall elect a
president, one or more vice presidents, a secretary, and a treasurer. The offices of secretary and treasurer may be held by the same
person, and a vice president may also be
either the secretary or the treasurer. The
board of directors may appoint such additional officers and such employees and agents
as it may from time to time determine. The
term of office of all officers shall be one year
or until their respective successors are elected
(or appointed) and qualified. However, the
board of directors may authorize the association to enter into an employment contract
with any officer in accordance with regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board;
but no such contract shall impair the right
of the board of directors to remove any officer
at any time. In the absence of designation
from time .to time of powers and duties by the
board of directors, officers shall have such
powers and duties as generally pertain to
their respective offices.
[23 F.K. 9893, Dec. 28, 1958, as amended at
26 FJR. 5173, June 9, 1961; SO FJR. 16106.
Dec. 28, 1965; 36 FR, 24113, Dec. 21, 1971;
38 FR 10253, Apr. 26, 1973; 38 FR 35436,
Dec. 28, 1973; 39 FR 28610. Aug. 9, 1974, as
amended at 39 FR 31301, Aug. 28, 1974; 39
FR 42341, Dec. 5,1974]
NOTE: The amendment at 39 FR 42341,
Dec. 5, 1974, becomes effective January 6,
1975.
§ 544*6—1 Preparedness
emergency
amendments to bylaws.

This section constitutes approval by
the Board of any one or more of the following amendments to the bylaws of any
Federal association, upon the valid
adoption of any such amendment by
such association's directors or members
as provided in its bylaws, effective when
so adopted:

(a) Emergency operations by surviving staff. In the event "of an emergency
declared by the President of the United
States or the person performing his
functions, the officers and employees of
this association will continue to conduct
the affairs of the association under such
guidance from the directors as may be
available except as to matters which by
statute require specific approval of the
board of directors and subject to conformance with any governmental directives during the emergency.
(b) Emergency operations by directors
or members of executive committee.
The board of directors shall have the
power, in the absence or disability of any
officer, or upon the refusal of any officer
to act, to delegate and prescribe such
officer's powers and duties to any other
officer, or to any director, for the time
being. In the event of a state of disaster
of sufficient severity to prevent the conduct and management of the affairs and
business of this association by its directors and officers as contemplated by
these bylaws, any two or more available
members of the then incumbent executive committee 6hall constitute a quorum
of that committee for the full conduct
and management of the affairs and business of the association in accordance
with the provisions of Article
of
these bylaws. In the event of the unavailability, at such time, of a minimum
of two members of the then incumbent
executive committee, any three available
directors shall constitute the executive
committee for the full conduct and management of the affairs and business of
the association in accordance with the
foregoing provisions of this section.
This bylaw shall be subject to implementation by resolutions of the board of
directors passed from time to time for
that purpose, and any provisions of these
bylaws (other than this section) and any
resolutions which are contrary to the
provisions of this section or to the provisions of any such implementary resolutions shall be suspended until it shall be
determined by any interim executive
committee acting under this section that
it shall be to the advantage of this association to resume the conduct and management of its affairs and business under
all of the other provisions of these bylaws.
(c) Officer succession. If consequent
upon war or warlike damage or disaster,
the president of this association cannot
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be located by the then acting home office
or is unable to assume or to continue
normal executive duties, then the authority and duties of the president shall,
without further action of the board of
directors, be automatically assumed by
one of the following persons in the order
designated: (List of names in order of
succession is shown in the official minutes of the association and in the certified copies which are under seal in
various depositories.)
Any one of the above persons who in
accordance with this resolution assumes
the authority and duties of the president
shall continue to serve until he resigns
or until five-sixths of the other officers
who are attached to the then acting
home office decide in writing he is unable
to perform said duties or until the elected
president of this association, or a person
higher on the above list, shall become
available to perform the duties of president of the association. If consequent
upon war or warlike damage or disaster,
the treasurer of this association cannot
be located by the then acting home office
or is unable to assume or to continue
normal executive duties, then the authority and duties of the treasurer shall,
without further action by the board of
directors, be automatically assumed by
one of the following persons in the order
designated: (List of names in order of
succession is shown in the official minutes of the association and in the certified copies which are under seal In various depositories.)
The person assuming the authority and
duties of treasurer in accordance with
this resolution shall serve until (1) the
elected treasurer or person whose name
is higher on the above list shall be able
to function as treasurer, or (2) until he
resigns or Is unable as determined by the
acting president to perform the duties
of his office. In the case of subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph, the next eligible
and available person on the above list
shall assume the authority and duties
of the treasurer. Anyone dealing with
this association may accept a certification by any three officers that a specified
individual is acting as president or that
a specified individual is acting as treasurer in accordance with this resolution;
and that anyone accepting such certification may continue to consider it in
force until notified In writing of a
change, said notice of change to carry

H44AS

the signatures of three officers of the association.
(d) Providing for alternate locations.
The offices of the association at which its
business shall be conducted shall be the
home office thereof located at
Street,
,
(and
branches, If any), and any other legally
authorized location which may be leased
or acquired by this association to carry
on its business. During an emergency
resulting in any authorized place of business of this association being unable to
function, the business ordinarily conducted at such location shall be relocated
elsewhere in suitable quarters, in addition to or in lieu of the locations heretofore mentioned, as may be designated
by the board of directors or by the executive committee or by such persons as are
then, in accordance with resolutions
adopted from time to time by the board
of directors dealing with the exercise
of authority in the time of such emergency, conducting the affairs of this association. Any temporarily relocated
place of business of this association shall
be returned to its legally authorized locations as soon as practicable and such
temporary place of business shall then
be discontinued.
(e) Providing for acting home offices.
In case of, and provided that, because
of war or warlike damage or disaster, the
Home Office of this association Is unable
temporarily to continue its functions,
Branch, located in
,
shall automatically and without further
action of this board of directors, become
the "Acting Home Office of this Association"; that If by reason of said war
or warlike damage or disaster, both the
Home Office of this association and the
said
Branch of this association are unable to carry on their functions, then and in such case, the
Branch of this association,
located in
, shall, without further action of this board of directors,
become the "Acting Home Office of this
Association"; and if neither
.
Branch nor
Branch can canry
on their functions, then the
Branch of this association, located in
, shall, without further action
of this board of directors, become the
"Acting Home Office of this Association."
The Home Office shall resume its functions at its legally authorized location as
soon as practicable.
[24 FJ&. 8461, Oct. 20, 1:950; 24 F R
Nov. 4,1959]
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CHAPTER 17
INTEREST ON MORTGAGE LOAN
RESERVE ACCOUNTS
S u n s e t ,-v\
Section
7-17-1.
7-17-2.
7-17-3.

7-17-4.

7-17-5.
7-17-6.

Section 63-55-7 provides that Title 7 terminates on July 1, 1989.

Legislative intent
Definitions.
Lender to pay interest — Exceptions
— Computation — Time for payment — Service charges prohibited — Written agreement
Options i n lieu of reserve account —
Notice by lender — Selection by
borrower — Nonmterest-bearing
reserve account
Statements,
Liability of lender for failure to pay
taxes, insurance premiums or
otiier charges-

7-17-1

Section
7-17-7.

7-17-8.
7-17-9.

7-17 10.

Limit on amount borrower required
to pay into account — Deficiency
— Method of recouping and remedies for default
Damages for lender's violation of act
— Limitations on recovery.
Actions on accounts, established
prior to 1979 •— Limitations on recovery.
Applicability of act to accounts and
actions thereon.

Legislative i n t e n t

It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act govern the
rights, duties and Kabilities of borrowers and lenders with respect to reserve
accounts established before and after the effective date of this act,
History: L. 1979, ch- 154, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act," referred to in this section, means Laws
1979, Chapter 124, which appears as §§ 7-17-1
to 7-17-10.
Compiler's NotesThe term Effective

date of this act," referred to in this section,
means the efifective date of Laws 1979, Chapter
124, i.e., July 1, 1979.
Cross-References. — Depository institutions exempt from escrow agent regulation,
§ 31A-24-101.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah L a w Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155.
C.J.S. — 47 C J . S . Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit § 15.

7-17-2.

Key Numbers.

Interest *=» 11.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Real estate loan" means any agreement providing for a loan secured by an interest in real estate in this state containing a residential
structure of not more than four housing units, at least one of whichls the
primary residence of the borrower and includes, but is not limited to,
agreements secured by mortgages, trust deeds, and conditional land sales
contracts.
(2) "Borrower" means any person who becomes obligated on a real estate loan at the time of origination of such loan and includes mortgagors,
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trustors under trust deeds and vendees under conditional land sales contracts.
(3) "Lender" means any person who regularly makes, extends or holds
real estate loans and includes, but is not limited to, mortgagees, beneficiaries under trust deeds and vendors .unDder conditional land sales contracts and who regularly require or maintain reserve accounts.
(4) "Person" includes an individual, a commercial bank, savings bank,
building and loan corporation, savings and loan association, credit union,
investment company, insurance company, pension fund, mortgage company, trust company, or any other organization making real estate loans.
(5) "Reserve account" means any account, whether denominated escrow, impound, trust,~pledge, reserve or otherwise, which is established in
connection with a loan secured by an interest in real estate located in this
state, whether or not a real estate loan as defined in this chapter, and
whether incorporated into the loan agreement or a separate document,
whereby the borrower agrees to make periodic prepayment to the lender
or its designee of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining
to the property securing the loan and the lender or its designee agrees to
pay the taxes, insurance premiums or other charges out of the account on
or before their due date.
(6) "Service charge" means any direct fee imposed in connection with
the administration of a reserve account.
(7) A loan is "made" when the lender makes its initial disbursement of
the loan proceeds.
History. L. 1979, chu 124, ?! ?.; 1981 ch. 15,
$ 1

7-17-3. Lender to pay interest — Exceptions — Computation — Time for payment — Service charges prohibited — Written agreement,
(1) Each lender requiring the establishment or continuance oi a reserve
account in connection with an existing or future real estate loan shall pay
interest on funds deposited in the account of at least blU% simple interest per
annum, unless:
(a) The reserve account is required by a governmental insurer or guarantor of the loan as a condition of insurance or guaranty;
(b) The reserve account is maintained in connection with.a real estate
loan in an original principal amount exceeding 80% of the lender's appraised value of the property at the time the loan is made provided that
when the principal balance of the loan is paid down to 80% this exception
shall not apply; or
(c) The payment of interest or other compensation to the jborrower for
the use of funds deposited in a reserve account is prohibited by federal
law or regulations.
(2) The interest shall be computed as of the end of the calendar year on the
average of the month end balances in the account for that calendar year or
partial calendar year, except that in the event of payoff of the real^estate loan,
interest shall be computed on the average month end balances in the account
for the partial year ending at the end of the month preceding payoff. The *
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interest shall, within 60 days after the end of each calendar y e a r , at t h e
election of the lender, be credited to the remaining ^principal b a l a n c e on t h e
loan, paid to the borrower, his successors or assigns, or credited to t h e reserve
account, except t h a t in the event of payoff of t h e real estate loan, t h e interest
shall be paid or credited to the borrower, his Successors or assigns within 30
days after the date of payoff.
(3) No lender shall require or impose a service charge for the a d m i n i s t r a tion of a reserve account.
(4) Except as provided in this section, no lender shall be obligated to p a y
interest on or aqcount for the earnings fi-om fimds in any reserve account i n
connection with t h e real estate loan made or held after J u n e 3 0 , 1 9 7 9 , unless
an agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by t h e borrower
and lender.
I i i f B l . d i l,»
§ 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Interest not required.
Interest required.
Interest not required.
Where lender had required borrower to establish a reserve account prior to June 30,
1979, and elected not to require borrower to
maintain the account after July 1, 1979, and
lender sent letter to borrower within the
proper time frame giving proper notice that the
account was no longer required and of borrower's options under 7-17-4, and borrower did
not respond to lender's letter, borrower was
deemed to have selected to continue the reserve account without interest and without
charge to him, and lender was not required to

pay interest on deposits to the account made
after June 30,1979. Nixon v. American Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 635 P.2d 24 (Utah 1981).
Interest required.
Lender must pay interest on the fimds deposited in reserve accounts if it requires borrowers
to continue to maintain reserve accounts on
existing loans made prior to June 3 0 , 1 9 7 9 , or
if it requires borrowers to establish reserve accounts on new loans made sfter J u n e 30,1979.
Nixon v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635
P.2d 24 (Utah 1981).

7-17-4. Options in lieu of reserve account — Notice b}
lender — Selection by borrower — Noninterestbearing reserve account.
U) A lender not requiring the establishment and maintenance ul a reserve
account shall offer the borrower the following options:
(a) The borrower may elect to maintain a non-interest-bearing reserve
account to be serviced by the lender at no charge to the borrower, or
(b) The borrower may manage the payment of insurance premiums,
taxes and other charges for his own account.
(2) The lender shall give written notice of t h e options to the borrower, (ij
with respect to real estate loans existing on the effective date by notice mailed
not more than 30 days after the effective date; (ii) with respect to r e a l estate
loans made on or after the effective date by notice given at or prior to the
closing of the loan. The notice shall clearly describe the options and s t a t e that
a reserve account is not required by the lender, that the borrower i s legally
549
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responsible for the payment of taxes, insurance premiums and other charges
and that the notice is being given pursuant to this act. For real estate loans in
existence on the effective date the borrower^must select one of the options
prior to 60 days after the effective date. If no. option is selected prior to*60 days
after the effective date the borrower will be deemed to have selected option
(a), provided, however, that the borrower at a later time may select option.(b).
For loans made on or after the effective date the borrower shall select one of
the options at the closing. If the borrower selects option (a), the lender shall
not be required to accoun,t for earnings, if any, on the account.
(3) If the borrower who_selects option (b), of his successors or assigns, fails
to pay the taxes, insurance premiums or other charges pertaining to the property securing the loan prior to the delinquency date for such payments, the
lender may require a reserve account without interest or other compensation
for the use of the funds; provided, that the lender may not require a reserve
account without interest or other compensation if (a) the borrower pays any
delinquency within 30 days and (b) the borrower has not previously been
delinquent in payment of taxes, insurance premiums or other charges.
History: L. 1979, ch. 124, § 4.
Meaning of **this act". — See note under
same catchline following § 7-17-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Interest not required.
If the lender elected not to require the continuance of a reserve account and gave proper
notice of that election along with available options to the borrower within the month of July,
1979, then no interest is payable on deposits
made to the account between July 1,1979, and
the time when the notice was received by the
^ T ^ ^ J ' n ^ r ^ i .
As^n, 635 R2d 24 (Utah 1981).
Where lender had required borrower to estabiish a reserve account prior to June 30,
1979, and elected not to require borrower to

7-17-5.

maintain the account after July 1, 1979, and
lender sent letter to borrower within the
proper time frame giving proper notice that the
account was no longer required and of borrower's options under this section, and borr o w e r ^ d n o t regp^d to lender's letter, borc^t^e
r o w e r w a s d e e m e d to h a v e Ge]ected
to
^ ^ ^ ^
^ ^
t h e reBerve a c c o u n t ^
out charge to him, and lender was not required
^ ^ Q n
acxounTmade
•r T
_
nn „rt__ £..
f"J™
'J^l'S^^'T^
^
**** ^ ^ 6 3 5 P ' 2 d ** ^ t a b 1981).

Statements.

Every lender shall furnish to the borrower, or his successors or assigns,
without charge, within 60 days after the end of each calendar year, an itemized statement showing moneys (1) received for interest and principal repayment and (2) received and held in or disbursed from a reserve account, if any.
History: L. 1979, ch. 124, § 5.

7-17-6, Liability of lender for failure to pay taxes, insurance premiums or other charges.
A lender administering a reserve account shall make timely payments of
taxes, insurance premiums and other charges for which the account is established, if funds paid into the account by the borrower, his successors or assigns, are sufficient for the payments. Negligent failure to make the payments
550
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required for taxes, insurance premiums and other charges as they become
due, from available funds in the reserve account, shall subject the lender to
liability for all damages directly resulting from the failure; provided that this
sentence shall not deprive the lender of the right to present any defense it
may have in any action brought to enforce the liability. Failure of the borrower or his successors or assigns to deliver promptly to the lender all notices
of tax assessments and insurance premiums or other charges, received by the
borrower, his successors or assigns, shall relieve the lender from liability
under this section.
History: L. 1079, ch- 124, § 6. _

7-17-7. Limit on amount borrower required to pay into account — Deficiency — Method of recouping and
remedies for default.
No lender in connection with a real estate loan shall require a borrower, his
successors car assigns, or a prospective borrower:
(1) to deposit in any reserve account established in connection with the
loan, prior to or upon closing, a sum exceeding the estimated total payments for taxes, insurance premiums or other charges which will be due
and payable on the date of closing, and the pro rata portion thereof which
has accrued, plus l/12th of the estimated total taxes, insurance premiums
and other charges which will become due and payable during the 12month period beginning on the date of closing; or
(2) to deposit in any reserve account in any month beginning after
closing a sum exceeding l/12th of the total estimated taxes, insurance
premiums, or other charges which will become due and payable during
the 12-month period beginning on the first day of the month, except that:
(a) If the lender determines there will be a deficiency on the due
date, it may require additional monthly deposits in the reserve account of pro rata portions of the deficiency corresponding to the number of months from the date of the lender's determination of the
deficiency to the date upon which the charges become due and payable;
(b) If the lender determines there is a deficiency on or after the due
date, it may bill the borrower, his successors or assigns, for the deficiency, which bill shall promptly be paid, or pay the deficiency, add
that amount to the principal, or charge the reserve account, and
require additional monthly deposits in the reserve account over the
next 12 months to recoup the deficiency. If the borrower, his successors or assigns, fails to pay any amount billed by the lender to meet
the deficiency, the lender may exercise any remedies for default contained in the real estate loan document. If such failure to pay continues for 30 days after written notice to borrower, the lender may
also terminate any obligation to pay interest or to otherwise pay
compensation for the use of the funds in the reserve account.
History: L 1979, ch. 124, § 7.
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7-17-8. Damages for lender's violation of act — Limitations on recovery.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a lender who violates this act is
liable to the borrower, his successors or assigns-, for the actual damages suffered by the borrower, his assigns or successors, or $100, whichever is greater.
If an action is commenced, the prevailing party may be awarded reasonable
attorney's fees as determined by the court.
(2) A lender has no liability under this section if the court finds that written demand for payment of the claim of the borrower, his successors or assigns, was made on the lender not less than 30 days before commencement of
the action and that the lender tendered to the borrower, his successors or
assigns, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount not less than the
damages awarded
(3) A lender may not be held liable under this section for a violation of this
act if the lender shows that the violation was not intentional and resulted
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures to
avoid such errors.
(4) A reserve account established or maintained in violation of this act is
voidable, at the option of the borrower, his successors or assigns, at any time,
but shall not otherwise affect the validity of the loan, the security interest in
the real property or any other obligation of the borrower.
(5) No action under this section may be brought more than one year after
the date of the violation.
History: L. 1979, ch. 124, $ 8.
Meaning of rtHns act". — See note under
same catchline following § 7-17-1.

7-17-9. Actions on accounts established prior to 1979 —
Limitations on recovery.
(1) With respect to any reserve account established prior, to July 1, 1979
and for which no legal action is pending as of January 1, 1979, no recovery
shall be had in any action brought to require payment of interest on, or other
compensation for, the use prior to July 1, 1979, of the funds in such account
unless:
(a) An agreement in writing expressly so providing was executed by
the borrower and the lender; or
(b) The borrower, or his successors or assigns, establishes by clear and
convincing evidence an agreement between the parties that the lender
would pay interest on or to otherwise compensate the borrower for the use
of the funds in such account Use in the loan documents of such words as
"trustor "pledge" alone shall not establish the intent of the parties; and
(c) There is no federal law or regulation prohibiting the payment of
interest on or otherwise compensating the borrower for the use of the
funds in such an account.
(2) No action seeking payment of interest on or other compensation for the
use of the funds in any reserve account for any period prior to July 1, 1979,
shall be brought after June 30,1981 Any recovery in any such action shall be
limited to the four-year period immediately preceding the commencement of
552
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the action. No recovery shall be had in respect of any reserve account established prior to July 1,1979 greater than if the provisions of § 7-17-3 of this act
were applicable to such accounts.
(3) With respect to any reserve account established prior to July 1,1979., an
agreement in writing between the lender andihe borrower, or his successors
or assigns, that (a) the provisions of § 7-17-S.of this act shall apply to all
payments made subsequent to July 1,1979, or (b) the borrower may exercise,
for the period subsequent to July 1, 1979, either of the options provided in
§ 7-17-4 of this act, shall bar any recovery by the borrower, his successors or
assigns, for interest on or other compensation for the use of the funds in such
account for any period prior to July 1, 1979.
History: I* 1979, ch. 124, § 9.

7-17-10. Applicability of act to accounts and actions
thereon.
The provisions of this act shall apply:
(1) to all reserve accounts; and
(2) to all actions filled after January 1, 1979, to recover interest on or
other compensation for the use of the funds in any reserve account
whether or not the reserve accounts were established prior to or subsequent to July 1, 1979.
History: L 1979, ch. 124, § 10.
Meaning of 'this actf*. — See note under
same catchline following § 7-17-1.

CHAPTER 18
FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(Repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 16, § 1)

7-18-1 to 7-18-6. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1981, ch. 16, § 1 repeals
$§ 7-18-1 to 7-18-6, as enacted by Laws 1980,

ch. 4, §§ 1 to 6, relating to foreign financial
institutions.

CHAPTER 19
ACQUISITION OF FAILING DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS OR
HOLDING COMPANIES
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-7 provides that Title 7 terminates on. JuK 1, 1989.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

RICHARD HADSEH and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife9 for themselves and all others similarly
situated 9
Plaintiffs,
C 77-0350
Had in Untod S W B District
Court Datnct c* Utih

PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself
and all others similarly
situated,

APR 1 9 1979
PAUL L BADGER
Clerk

Defendants,
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION,

ORDER

Intervener.

PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,

C 77-0111

v.
RICHARD MADSEK and NANCY
MADSEN,
Defendants.

The above-entitled actions came before the court on
April 6 and 9, 1979, for hearing on various n o t i o n s .

The court,

having considered the memoranda of counsel and t h e i r oral arguments, enters the following order:
(1)

Mad sens' motion to remand in C 77-0350 i s denied.

Federal question j u r i s d i c t i o n i s present in .this action by virtue
o f 12 C.F.R. | 5 4 5 . 6 - U ( c ) and the rule of North Davis Bank v .

First National Bank of Lay ton» 457 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1972)
(action is removable if "directly concerned with the construe
of federal law and a determination of rights thereunder'1),
action was timely removed in that Prudential filed a petitioi
for removal on behalf of the defendant class within thirty dj
after October 12, 1977, the date when Mad sens were granted L
to amend their complaint to allege a defendant class.

Prudei

was entitled to remove on behalf of the defendant class with
regard to the probability or improbability of eventual certi
tion of the defendant class.
(2) Madsens 1 motion to dismiss for lack of federa
question jurisdiction in C 77-0350 is denied.
questions remain in this action.
is inappropriate.

Important fed

Madsens 1 reliance on res j

Res judicata does not prevent this court

considering federal issues that were previously ignored by t
state courts in the course of this litigation.
lawsuit is involved here.

No subsequen

This is simply a later stage of t

same lawsuit that was before the state courts.
(3) The Federal Home Loan Bank Board's motion foi
to file an amicus brief is granted.

The Board's brief, wh±c

filed with the court on September 21, 1978, is received.
(4) Madsens 1 motion to continue disposition of Pi
tial's motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment penc
determination of class issues is denied.

For reasons statec

below, the court is persuaded that Madsens 1 claim against
Prudential is wholly without merit.

Since it is manifest ti

they cannot succeed on the merits, it is unnecessary to proc
to class certification before resolving the controversy on t

2-

merits.
(5)

Prudential's motions for summary judgment in both

cases are granted.

Under the federal preemption doctrine, Madsens

have no claim against Prudential for i n t e r e s t on t h e i r escrow
account.

12 C.F.R. § 5 4 5 . 6 - l l ( c ) c l e a r l y precludes the r e l i e f

the Madsens are seeking.

That regulation i s not subject to

attack under the theory that i t retroactively abrogates vested
rights.

There i s no assurance that, under s t a t e law, Madsens

at any time had any kind of r i g h t , much l e s s an inviolable
vested right, to receive i n t e r e s t on the escrow funds.

More

importantly, the regulation cited above does not appear to a l t e r
i

the federal law applicable to. loans made before June 16, 1975,
but instead appears to reaffirm the impact of 12 C.F.R. SS 544.1
("association is not required to distribute earnings on shortterm savings accounts") and 541.5 (defining short-term savings
account as including mortgage loan escrow accounts for taxes and
insurance).
(6)

Intervenor's motion to strike defendant class

allegations is granted.

Under the holdings of La Mar v. H & B

Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973) and Weiner v.
Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the
Madsens lack standing to sue defendants other than Prudential
and cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements of typicality and adequate representation.

Moreover, it

appears to the court that certification of the defendant class
would be futile in any event because of the great probability that
defendant class members would take advantage of the "opting out"
provisions of Rule 23(c).

-3-

The conspiracy and juridical relationship exceptio
the La Mar and Weiner doctrines are not applicable in this c
No conspiracy or juridical relationship among defendants has
pleaded or shown to e x i s t .

The vague allegation of an indus

wide practice provides insufficient basis for finding a juri
relationship.

Moreover, the lending i n s t i t u t i o n s i n questic

operate under diverse bodies of law and d i s t i n c t l y separate
regulatory agencies.
(7)

Madsens1 motion to maintain p l a i n t i f f and dei

classes i s denied.

The defendant class cannot be maintainec

the reasons stated above with respect to the motion to stril
class allegations and for the further reason that a defendat
class action does not appear to be superior to other availal
methods for the fair and e f f i c i e n t adjudication of the contj
Since the defendant class cannot be maintained, neither can
p l a i n t i f f class survive except for those who are Prudential
borrowers.

Since those persons clearly have no cause of ad

i t serves no useful purpose to c e r t i f y a c l a s s of Prudential
borrowers.

The court i s persuaded that no class certificat:

i s now in effect.

The c e r t i f i c a t i o n order entered by the s

court was nullified by the amendment of Madsens1 complaint
allege a vastly broader class of p l a i n t i f f s .
(8)

Madsens1 motion to give notice to c l a s s memb

and motion for leave to communicate with c i t i z e n s committee
denied.
(9)

All other motions pending i n these actions a

dismissed as moot.

-4-

For the reasons stated herein and for the further
reasons stated by the court on the record on April 6 and 9,
1979,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

M

day of April, 1979.

Uu^LA/h^^
ALDON J . ANDERSON

United State4^District Judge
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1 Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98 and 1
Minute Entry dated 3/20/98
Denied by Minute Entry dated 6/16/98

4adsens' Motion to Amend Conclusion of 1
.aw f 5
4adsens' Amended Motion to Enlarge
]!lass Definition
*4adsens5 Motion for Sanctions

Dated 12/3/96

4adsens' Motion to Amend Conclusion of
,aw Tf 7 Based on New Case Law and
teopen the Trial for the Limited Purpose of
/taking Findings or Statute of Limitation
ssues
^ladsens' Second Motion to Amend
Conclusion of Law f 5
/ladsens' Motion to Amend Conclusion of
,aw U 13 or Finding of Fact % 15
Memorandum of Newly Uncovered
mthority with Respect to Motion to Amend
Conclusion of Law f 5
dadsens' Notice to Submit for Decision the
dternative Portions of Plaintiffs' Motion to
unend Conclusion of Law f 5
4adsens' Motion to Amend Decision of
anuary 20, 1998 to Correct Internal
^consistency
ladsens' Objection to Master's Report and
lotion to Change Masters
ladsens' Motion to Amend Minute Entry)rder of March 20, 1998, or in the
Jternative Motion to Enter Conclusion of
aw Interpreting §7-17-10(2)

Dated 12/1/97

Considered "resolved" by Order dated
12/5/97, and no action taken
Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98

Dated 12/1/97

Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98

Dated 12/1/97

Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98

Dated 1/20/98

Stricken by Minute Entry dated 1/20/98

Dated 2/2/98

Denied by Minute Entry dated 3/20/98

Dated 2/19/98

Denied by Minute Entry dated 4/17/98

Dated 2/24/98

Denied by Minute Entry dated 4/17/98

Dated 4/24/98

Denied by Minute Entry dated 6/18/98

Dated 1/15/97
Dated 1/24/97

1

1

Madsens5 Motion to Settle Conflicting
1
Orders
Madsens' Petition for Writ of Mandamus to 1
Utah Supreme Court (attacking the July 1,
1979, damage cut-off period established by
Conclusion of Law f 5),
Madsens' Motion to Strike Conclusion of
Law f 5 Based on Superceding Case Law
Madsens' Motion to Judge Stirba to Appoint
(Retired) Judge Rigtrup as Senior Master
|
Madsens' Objection to Master's Report and
Motion to Change Masters
Madsens' Petition for Permission to Appeal
from Interlocutory Order to Utah Supreme
Court, (challenging Conclusion of Law ^J 5)
Motion To Amend Conclusion Of Law *| 4
Based On Intervening Case Law
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law f 13
Based Upon Year 2000 Case Law dated
March 17, 2000
Madsens' Motion to Vacate Order of March
9, 1999 (arguing that Prudential's 1979
Notice failed to comply with the Act
Motion to Re-Define the Class Per Judge
Croft's Class Certification Order of July 13,
1977
Motion to Vacate this Court's Minute
Entry/Order of 8/6/01 Based on Fraud and
Deceit
1 Madsens' Motion to Disqualify the Master
and That All of His Work Be Vacated
1 Madsens' Renewed Motion to Disqualify
\ +U<* A/fno+^*- H a c o r l o n T?PPPtit T l p V P l o t r m e n t S

Dated 8/6/98

1 Denied by Minute Entry dated 10/27/98

Dated 9/10/98

Denied by Utah Supreme Court by Order
dated 10/26/98

Dated 12/17/98

Denied by Minute Entry dated 3/9/99

Dated 12/24/98

Denied by Minute Entry dated 3/9/99

Dated 12/25/98

Denied by Minute Entry dated 4/17/98

Dated 3/26/99

Denied by Utah Supreme Court by Order
dated 6/3/99

Dated 7/22/99

Denied by Minute Entry dated 10/7/99

Dated 3/17/00

Denied by Minute Entry dated 5/16/00

Dated 10/27/00

Denied by Mem. Decision dated 2/4/02

Dated 4/18/01

Denied by Minute Entry dated 8/6/01

Dated 9/17/01

Denied by Memorandum Decision dated
2/4/01

Dated 9/20/01

Denied by Order dated 1/2/02

Dated 3/18/02

Denied by Minute Entry dated 1/15/03

1
I

conclusion of Law ^ 5 Based Upon New
Evidence and New Case Law
Motion that the Court (not the Master)
Compute an Award for "Aggregate Class
Damages"
Motion That Final Accounting Conform In
All Respects To The Mandate Of The
Supreme Court
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law f 13
Based Upon Year 2003 Case Law and to
Allow Prejudgment Interest
_ ^
Motion to Amend Conclusion of Law If 13
Based Upon Newly Decided Case of Smith
v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.
Motion to Amend Conclusions of Law f 4
and Tf 9 Based on New Case Law
Madsens5 Renewed Motion to Disqualify
the Master

J29574

Dated 12/16/02

Withdrawn 7/9/03

Dated 5/14/03

Denied by Order dated 1/23/04

Dated 7/9/03

Denied by Order dated 1/23/04

Dated 10/30/03

Denied by Order dated 1/23/04

Dated 11/20/03

Denied by Order dated 1/23/04

Dated

Denied by Order dated 1/23/04

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-OoOooRICHARD MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 226073

PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself
and all others similarly
situated,
Defendants.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
September 4, 5, 6, 198 5
BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP
District Court Judge
[Sitting Without a Jury]

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the Plaintiffs:

Robert J. DeBry
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

For the Defendants:

Joseph J. Palmer
Re id E. Lewis
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

GAYLE B. CAMPBELL ^
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
SALT LAKt CITY UTAH

account actually experiences.
QL

Is it Prudentialfs practice to post revenues

!

and expenses to.these individual escrow accounts?
A.

No, they have never done that, and that!s

not the practice within the industry, as I understand
it.

It would require a tremendous amount of record-keeping;

to post revenues and expenses to the individual escrow
accounts.

;
i
But if one did, using a fully allocated basis, !

as I have done, or a modified allocated basis, it would

;

show seasonal activity as depicted in Exhibit D-6.
Q.

Would it cost anything to post that revenue

and expense to individual accounts?
A.

Yes, it would be very expensive, particularly

back in the '60's and early ' 70's when much less of this
activity was computerized than now is the case.
Q.

And what would be the effect if you do do

A.

If you do do it?

ft

Yes.

A.

To further compound the costs and thereby

that?

shift up the red line shown on Exhibit D-6, and further
create deficits on the overall escrow servicing.
ft

Did Prudential incur costs and expenses

on Mr. Madsen's escrow account each month during the
15-year period?

119
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1

I

A.

Yes

2 I

Q.

And have you made a c o m p u t a t i o n of

3

A.

That's basically what's revealed

4

that?

in

E x h i b i t D-6

5

QL

And what is Exhibit D-7?

6

A.

D-7 shows the next difference on a cumulative

7

basis between the revenues and expenses throughout a

8

typical calendar year.

9

year is to again avoid criticism in choosing which year

The reason I say typical calendar

10

I would depict in the exhibit.

11

Januarys, all Februarys, all Marches for the entire period.

12

And what it shows is that the horizontal line labeled

13

I

14

I have combined all

with zeros would be a break-even point of servicing this
escrow account throughout the year

15 I

The expenses early in the year exceed the

16 I

revenues, so the account starts in the red or in a deficit

17

position of approximately $2 in January, and that further

18

increases for two more months, and then going to the midpart

19

of the year when the revenue-earning ability exceeds the

20

costs for a period of time, which has the effect of eating

21

away at this cumulative deficit until it hits a low point

22

J

in the month of August.

23

I

expenses start to increase, the deficit once again increase

24

I

and hits a high point in December.

25

Q.

And thereafter, because the

So that cumulatively, accommodating each

120

one on top of the other through the year, there never
is a profit earned on the Madsen account; is that correct?
A.

For the whole —

collectively speaking,

for the whole 15-month period, that's right.
Q.

All right.

Now then, have you prepared

a summary exhibit to illustrate your testimony?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And which one was that?

A.

That is Exhibit D-8.

QL

All right.

A.

Yes.

That is your work?

Well, I had assistants helping me

on it, but I directed it, yes.
QL

I meant yours as opposed to Prudential's.

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

Exhibit D-8.
A.

Describe what we see

in

What is it?
Exhibit D-8 pulls together basically all

of the types of revenue and expenses we've been discussing
and determines the bottom-line loss experienced on the
Madsen account for the period 1964 through 1978.

It shoul

be read going from left to right under the various steps
which have been calculated to the ultimate conclusion
depicted by the column on the far right.
QL

Let's start right at the top.

It says

"Madsen Escrow Profit/Loss, All Investment Securities."
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The charts are m
2 I
3

the courtroom, the summary of the

records is in the courtroom,
Q.

But the original documents you looked at,

4

the ones up m

5

original documents you looked at to prepare these charts,

6

they are not m

the granite vaults and so on, and the

the courtroom, are they?

7

A.

They are in the courtroom.

8

Q.

Where?

9

A.

In brief cases and boxes.

10

Q.

Every document you looked at is in the

11

courtroom?

12

k

All that come to mind, yes.

13

Q.

Then I f ll withdraw that portion.

I would

14

like to have the chance to have a break and examine those

15

documents for purposes of cross-examination.
But the first two bases for my objection

16
17

stand; that is, that there is a hearsay objection.

18

relied on out-of-court discussions with many people, and

19

the out-of-court experiment.

20

and perhaps a t i m e - m - m o t i o n study, I guess.
THE COURT:

21
22

weight and credibility.

He relied on walking through

It's overruled.

It goes to

You may answer.

23

Q,

(By Mr. Palmer)

24

A.

My opinion is:

25

He

What is your opinion?
Analyzing the profitability

as the differende between revenue and expenses, it shows

135

might be multiple steps, but that would be a very modest
numbering, something totaling —

well, something less

than ten steps per year, whereas we have seen a total
of seventy-four steps required for an average escrow
account.
Q.

So how does the cost of handling escrow

accounts with respect to making any profit off them
compare to the cost of handling passbook savings accounts'
It doesn!t compare very well, but the

k

disparity is that there's much higher cost in handling
escrow accounts than in handling passbook accounts.
MR. PALMER:

You may cross-examine.

Oh, excuse me.

I'll offer the exhibits,

please.
MR. DeBRY:

I have the same objection I

made earlier, and the Court has already ruled on that.
But I would like to preserve that objection.
MR. PALMER:
THE COURT:
exception.

Exhibits D-3 through 8.
The record may note the

The exhibits will be received.
MR. DeBRY:

You may cross,

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. DeBRY:
Q,

Mr. Norman, on direct examination you told
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1

escrows for the whole class and comes up with a nice

2

round number of $13 million that we have stolen from

3

the public.

4

Mr. Madsen's account.

7
8
9

This exhibit should be stricken.

THE COURT:

5
6

The inquiry here is as to the earnings on

&

(By Mr. DeBry)

quickly what it is?
A.

It will be received.
Would you like to explain

I'm not sure.

It's an accumulation for all the escrow

fund balances, not only Mr. Madsen's but for all. I

10

used the very low T-bill yield which was the lowest

11

computation that I made.

12

rate and the net earnings, multiplied it by the total

13

escrow funds and arrived at a balance which was accumulated!

14

by years.

15

MR. DeBRY:

16

MR. PALMER:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. PALMER:

19

MR. DeBRY:

20

MR. PALMER:

25

Is it offered?
Pardon?
Is it offered?
It's offered and received,

I object to it as irrelevant,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

23
24

Thank you.

I think.

21
22

Compared the average expense

Q.

Received.

(By Mr. DeBry)

In going through these

charts you ha ve computed the lost earnings or profits in

3
•*.

two or three different methods, do you have an opinion
as a cost accountant with respect to which of these various
methods most accurately reflects the actual lost earnings
to Mr. Madsen?
k

If I had to choose one —

they are all

very similar and come out within $100 of each other

—

it would be the amount they actually earned on their
investments that they actually made.
Q.

Which chart is that?
THE COURT:

Actual weighted average.

THE WITNESS:

Average Prudential yields

on Schedule 8.
QL

(By Mr. DeBry)

Explain why you believe

that's the most accurate computation and if you believe
that's a conservative figure.
A.

Because of the commingling of the deposits

once they get in the bank, there's really no tracing
any one kind of

dollars versus another kind of dollar.

They are all commingled and invested in various instruments
and earn an average yield.

So it's impossible to trace

one dollar versus another dollar and say that this is
what they earned on their fungible money, i.e., deposits
that were received in the bank.
Qi

Do you believe that's conservative as

compared with other possibilities?
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«! J
2 I

Q.

I don't want to interrupt the witness,

but I keep getting argument.

3 |
4 I

THE COURT:

MR. PALMER:

6

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE WITNESS:
J

It's not argument.

He's ;just

explaining his methods and how he arrived at it.

5

9

!

;

Okay.
Should I continue, your Honor?
You may
For a dollar of passbook

savings that comes m , the institution pays a passbook

10

rate, which is the cost to them plus they pay their

11

operating costs and they earn a profit
In this particular case, in an escrow depositj

12
13

they don't pay the passbook rate, they pay the operating

14

expenses.

15

deposit, subtract the operating expenses and if it costs

16

about the same to handle passbook savings as it does

•17 I

to handle escrow accounts, you should arrive at the same

18

difference as what the institution pays o n its passbook

•J9

savings.

20 I

So you take what they earned from that escrow

It all makes sense to m e , anyway

Q>

(By Mr. Palmer)

Assuming that it costs

21

the same to handle passbook accounts as it does for escrow

22 |

deposits?

23 I

A.

24 I
25

That's correct.

That's one of the fundamental

assumptions.
&

And Mr. Stewart, do you know of any study
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And does the i n t e r e s t and dividend income

a l s o i n c l u d e the i n t e r e s t earned on mortgages?
A.

Yes, s i r .

I

Q.

And in your computations on Schedule 5,

you haven't figured any cost factor whatsoever?
A.

The average passbook amount is certainly

a cost factor to the savings and loan.

They pay that

to depositors.
Q.

Show me on Schedule 5 where you went through

and took out any money for employee costs.
A.

Schedule 5 was used to determine what the

spread was between average passbook, which is the cost
of the deposits coming in and the amount earned.

In

the later schedule we did subtract the costs which I
calculated by taking the total variable costs and dividing
it by the total deposits.
Q.

And Schedule 6, again, doesn't have a cost

deduction except as you might argumentatively say that
it is included in passbook yield.
A.

That's correct.

Thats1 just to make the

Court aware of what earnings would be if you just took
the passbook weight.
THE COURT:

And that's in the wonderful

land of assumptions, isn't it?
THE WITNESS:

That's right, your Honor.
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1

entitled, at m i n i m u m , to an offset against their

2

or I'd

3

profits,

indebtednejss,

assume it would follow, a d i s g o r g e m e n t of those

4

I view that as the law of the c a s e , and
I also d o n f t view t h i s , even though

5

inescapable.

6

in the context of u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t , it g i v e s me the

7

prerogative of trying the case based upon just and unjust

8

in terms of enrichment.

9

The Supreme Court says that the

cast

Madsens

10

are entitled to an accounting

^

what I think I am obliged to follow.

12

at all by burden of p r o o f .

13

day o u t , the concept w a s told over and over and over

14

to m e as a lawyer, as I practiced in these c o u r t s , by

15

D. Frank Wilkins in his r u l e , w h i c h was "He w h o a l l e g e s ,

16

must p r o v e . "

17

for p r o f i t s , so that is
I f m not

As far as I see day in and

That is the basic fundamental rule in this

18

case.

19

r e s t r i c t i o n s , had been tortured in terms of

20

process in this m a t t e r .

21

or one does n o t , it's not a requirement or

22

that y o u abandon common sense.

23

I graduated in accounting.

24
25

troubled

And the C o u r t , g i v e n those limitations

and

the-decisional

W h e t h e r one b e c o m e s an e x p e r t
prerequisite

M r . N o r m a n knows

So I do have some

that

background.

I think too m u c h , at t i m e s , is m a d e

of

the fact that it almost rises to a point of science

rather
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1

i

than an art, though you use the term art.

And I guess

2

I

the best common sense example of why I perceive there

3

is some overkill in the area is that I was a farm boy,

4

and farmers, with the corner of their shopping bag and

5

a lead pencil, could do more in 15 minutes grappling

5

I

with weather, grappling with soil conditions, grappling

7

with fertilizing problems, grappling with a choice of

8

seeds and all that they have to program in, and still

9

persist in that activity day in and day out.

And that's

10

something which seems to me could confound enough cost

11

accountants to circle the globe.

12

it f s an exercise in judgment.

13

It's not a science,

And it seems to me that if the conclusions

14

that are followed by the cost accounting approach are

15

followed, management would have failed a long time ago.

16

The funds are and have been of benefit to Prudential

17 I

Federal Savings & Loan over the years.

18

a base over which to spread costs.

ig

against default, and provide security.

20

They provide

They provide a hedge

1 realize there are some federal regulations

2«|

about that, though Prudential, as did other savings and

22

loans, banks, and other institutions, followed the state

23

statute in terms of turning that practice around.

24

as I recall, part of the regulation provided that state

25

law could be files.

And

But if in the last years when costs,
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1

as you indicated, Mr. Norman, went up enormously —

2

they did —

3

followed that analysis, would have somehow found a lower

4

cost alternative rather than keep a loss leader.

5

them more credit than that.

Prudential Federal, if it really strictly

that weren't collection problems in those accounts.

7
I

9

as to those, I would submit that they would have found

that function.

The generation of deposits, the generation

of loans are essential productive features of their

11

bueiness.

12

The function of escrow accounts is a nonessential

function, other than as they perceive it to be essential

13

by virtue of federal regulations.

14

And the process of

billing, receiving payments, and many of those other

15

17

And

some sort of service bureau, or whatever, to perform

10

16

I give

There were certainly triple A accounts

6

8

as

I

things is not greatly different,with or without escrow
accounts.

18

The Court is persuaded of that clearly

19

and convincingly by a preponderance of the evidence.

20

It follows as night the day.

2i

I had experience as a young lawyer, going

22

out and opening an office, of doing a lot of collection

23

work.

24

good secretary can push an awful lot of volume and paper,

25

and that was before word processing and the fine things

You do get established, and one lawyer and one
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1

that lawyers have today.

2

lithographs and other w a y s to maybe accomplish

3

things in a less efficient w a y , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s , you

4

learn in a short time h o w to handle great volumes of

5

p a p e r w o r k with a very small amount of people

6

I'm convinced

7 I
8

We understood

j

9 I

that there

ere

these

in a very persuasive

way

that the function of servicing escrow accounts is n o t
a m o n u m e n t a l task, and that it can be achieved by a relativje
small amount of p e o p l e .

Once you shift from an

escrow

10

e n v i r o n m e n t to a n o n e s c r o w e n v i r o n m e n t , many of the

n

that are performed in that d e p a r t m e n t aren't going

12

be greatly diminished.

13

they are going to keep the d a t a p r o c e s s i n g

14 I

and I'm really persuaded by M r . Stewart's analysis

15

if y o u have an appropriate a l l o c a t i o n , it more

15

sensically follows that those costs be attributed

17

the p r o d u c t i v e aspects of the b u s i n e s s .

18

to

They are going to keep the building],
capabilities,
that

commonto

It does not a p p e a r to be rational at a l l ,

19

as per E x h i b i t

20

and they w o u l d still m a i n t a i n that function w i t h o u t

21

some b i g c o r r e c t i o n s .

22

function

8, that costs w o u l d escalate in that

I think M r . N o r m a n and M r . Stewart

fashion]
making

would

23

b o t h r e c o g n i z e the judgment a s p e c t of any

allocation

24

p r o c e s s , and I think they w o u l d both recognize t h a t

they

25

n e i t h e r one m a y have the p e r f e c t solution or all of

the
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1
2

answers.
I think they both would be candid, and

3

I respect them for both being honest and upfront.

4

the computerized and mechanization process added such

5

a heavy burden to the cost, it would have been a better

6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

If

management decision to persist with shoe boxes and a
mechanical process, rather than allowing the costs to
double in a short period of time when the benefit to
be gained was as minimal as it was.
I think, moreover, Mr. Stewart's analysis
of the escrow account balances were, as I recall, in
the range of 20 per cent lower.

I donft know whether

that's more accurate or less accurate than your analysis,
Mr. Norman, except that it demonstrates a conservative
bias in favor of Prudential Federal rather than Mr. Madsen,
There was something said about working

17

capital, that it also seems to me there is —

I think

18

it's maybe unrealistic and idealistic to think that there

19

is instantaneous management of those funds, and there

20

may be a little bias in the analysis of Mr. Stewart,

21

and there is some justification of working capital slack.

22

Moreover, given the high interest rates and the levels

23

we're talking about, management doesn't let large amounts

24

of uninvested funds go for 60 days, and they are moving

25

them into a mode of investment where they can derive

505

daily yield-kind of investments at times to keep the
funds working.

As for the assignment of a lot of costs,

Ifm impressed that the building is a sunk cost, and the
assignment of a large amount of that really doesn't track
the function.
Ifm convinced that advertising to generate
the productive aspect of the business; namely, loans
and deposits, doesnft have as part of its function to
generate escrow business.

They are not in the business,

really, of providing escrow business as a primary function
And I think the bulk of the high level management decisions)
really arenft involved in managing day-to-day escrow
decisions.

It seems to the Court that most of that is

clerical and doesn't require the highest order of skills.
The high order of skills are more required,
though, in terms of investment decisions and things of
that kind.

So to apportion a substantial portion of

that to that process appears to the court to be non founded|
in common sense.
There were other specific things that I
think are of similar rationality as far as I view the
overall record.

If the Court feels it had an unjust

enrichment kind of case, I think the Court would find
the decision easy.

But my perception is that I am locked

in by a decision of the Supreme Court that simply found
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it to be a pledge, and that those funds had to be accounted
2

for to the customer.

3

and it's put me in a tortuous kind of position that,

4 J

notwithstanding my underlying biases and feelings, I

5

feel that I have no choice.

Q I

And it's that plain and simple,

I think there have been errors in both

7

analyses in one way or another, but in thinking about

o

it all, the court finds and concludes that the approach

g

that Mr. Stewart took in his Schedule 7, which uses the

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

short-term T-bill rate more closely approximates the
short period of turnover with escrow accounts and the
investment options.

And the court finds it reasonable

to conclude that on the Madsen account, during the period
from March 3, 1971 through June 30, 1979, that there
was total cumulative earnings on the Madsen account earned
of $109.43.

And that it would further be appropriate,

as a finding,that as a matter of fact, that the Madsens

18 I

would have a total cumulative effect of earnings on those

19

funds bringing the total to $134.70.

20

MR. PALMER:

2i

THE COURT:

$134.70?
Yes.

Plaintiffs, accordingly,

22

are awarded judgment for $134.70 plus allowable costs.

23

And with respect to the mechanics, I haven't worked out

24

anything with respect to the overall class impact it

25

would have.

So the issue of what the ramifications are
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